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1 Introduction 
 
The performance as well as the competitiveness of purchasing companies is strongly 
influenced by the suppliers used. Consequently, companies can achieve a competitive 
advantage by selecting an appropriate supplier base. This base is characterised by 
suppliers offering a certain level of quality, flexibility and innovativeness coupled with 
adequate prices. Buyers begin to link and integrate these providers into their value 
creation process and, thus, establish closer relationships. (Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.25) 
Today, a growing number of integrated supplier-buyer relationships can be observed. 
The answer to intricate market dynamics shaping the present business environment 
lies in the formation of such relationships. These dynamics are induced by market 
liberalisation, globalisation, capital market pressures, constantly developing information 
technologies, etc. The choice of suppliers’ integration is adequate due to its ability to 
advance stability and reduce complexity. Starting with the reduction of the supplier 
base in order to intensify the remaining relations, its execution is finalised after making 
specific investments and mutual adjustments. (Cf. id., p.1) 
This trend is accompanied by disadvantages, such as increased dependency, more 
complex management requirements and decreasing flexibility of the relationship itself. 
As long as the performance of the supplying company meets the expectations, no 
problems arise in this regard. But, if a supplier’s weakness is identified and thus has 
implications on the performance, the above mentioned negative concomitants become 
a threat leading to inflexibility related to switching the supplier. Switching the supplier 
is, besides maintaining the existing relationship and trying to improve it, a possible 
reaction to identified weaknesses. (Cf. id., p.70) 
The above mentioned inflexibility could be prevented if ending the relationship would 
be taken into account from the outset and if the option of exit would be regulated in the 
contract concluded between the parties. In order to obviate the risk of dependency, it is 
purposive to keep up with the alternatives available on the suppliers market. Generally, 
in case of switching the incumbent supplier, a structured and professional switching 
management is essential to guarantee a smooth process for all parties involved. (Cf. 
Kirst et al., 2007, p.421) 
 
Supplier switching and decisions made in this context are of growing importance within 
business processes but represent a topic that is insufficiently examined. Therefore, the 
work at hand deals with this subject matter and thereby focuses on the decision of 
buyers whether a supplier switch should be carried out or not. For this purpose, it will 
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be reverted to two models which, in their way, try to provide evidence when and how to 
switch. In order to introduce the topic, basic aspects, such as impulses initiating 
switching and phases which have to be run through in the course of a supplier switch, 
are clarified first. Concluding, due to its importance, a separate examination of factors 
retarding or even inhibiting a supplier switch will be made. 
 
As a basis, the terms connected with the topic of supplier switching have to be defined 
in order to show how they will be used in the course of this work. “The word ‘switch’ 
can be used interchangeably with ‘change’, which affects two dimensions: a content-
related layer, which describes what will be changed, and a relational-related layer, 
which describes the forms of relationships and the interaction patterns.” (Kirst, 2008, 
p.24) The term ‘supplier switch’ is defined as “the change of a purchasing company’s 
supplier structure, in which an existing integrated supplier will be substituted completely 
or […] [partially] by a new supplier” (Id., p.25). Relating to the ‘act of switching’, it has to 
be considered that it “is not restricted to the selection of the most appropriate actor and 
the negotiation of the contract [but that it] […] also includes the activities related to 
channel design, implementation and operation, and finally, the dissolution of the 
temporary cooperation […]. Thus, switching can be seen as an act of change or as a 
process.” (Verduijn, 2004, p.138) 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: First, factors creating a need for 
and determining the easiness of switching are considered. The balancing of the need 
for and the easiness of switching delivers insights into the switching behaviour of 
buying companies which depends on whether these factors are high or low. 
The proximate section deals with the different phases which have to be run through in 
the course of a supplier switch. These phases contain activities ranging from actions 
taken prior to the switching decision to the final success evaluation after the performed 
switch. 
The main part comprises two models which deal with the option of replacing the 
incumbent supplier using different approaches to find out when and how it is optimal to 
switch. The main focus of the first model is on the comparison of entry and auditing as 
instruments to verify the reported costs of the established supplier against the 
background of changing the supplier or remaining with the present one. The second 
model’s objective is to provide assistance to organisations in the course of choosing 
the best possible sourcing strategy. This is done by taking asymmetrical information, 
switching costs, competition and economies of scale into consideration. Thereby, 
partial switching is introduced as another aspect having to be considered. 
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The final section deals with factors having a hindering impact on the decision in favour 
of supplier switching. Buyers spending large amounts of resources and time to improve 
the incumbent supplier’s performance before taking the option of switching into account 
is one particular issue examined in this regard. The chapter closes by outlining the 
strategic orientation a potential entrant supplier is advised to adhere to when inertia is 
present. 
 
When quoting other authors, evident orthographical errors will be corrected tacitly 
without changing the content of the quoted statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
2 The need for and the easiness of 
switching 
 
In order to provide a better insight into the subject matter, the “factors that create a 
need for switching, the factors that determine the easiness of switching, and the 
strategy in finding the right balance between the need [for] and easiness of switching” 
(Verduijn, 2004, p.295) have to be considered. When doing so, Verduijn (2004) serves 
as the following chapter’s key source. 
 
2.1 The need for switching 
 
The term ‘need for switching’ implies the reasons as well as the respective motivation 
to change the current supplier-buyer relationship. Generally speaking, the capabilities 
and capacities needed do not coincide with those at hand. This lack of conformity can 
be traced back to “changes in demand, supply and the wider environment of the 
organisation”. (Id., p.133) If it cannot be resolved neither by the organisation nor by the 
present supplier within a certain time span and/or at a reasonable cost, a switch is the 
recommended solution to be carried out. (Cf. id., p.133f.) 
The need for switching in the broader sense is associated with the motives for 
switching as well as the contingencies triggering the need, influencing the frequency 
and determining the urgency of switching. What is called ‘motives of switching’ in 
particular refers to the reasons of terminating an established supplier-buyer 
relationship. Triggers, as the name implies, lead to the arising of the need. Whereas 
“frequency expresses how often switching is required” (Id., p.149), urgency specifies 
the importance of switching with regard to remaining competitive. (Cf. id., p.148f.) 
 
2.1.1 Motives leading to supplier switching 
 
In the following, motives leading to supplier switching will be examined more closely. 
(Cf. id., p.134) 
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Prices 
Still being a crucial part in running a business in matters of procurement, low prices are 
among the most important motives that lead to the replacement of the current supplier. 
(Cf. ibid.) Established suppliers hold the ability to abuse their status and unremarkably 
increase the price. This happens, for example, through the introduction of a seemingly 
renewed product to replace the preceding one. Afore stipulated discounts will be 
lowered in the course of such a process, raising the supplier’s profit margin. (Cf. 
Heijboer, 2003, p.149) Another problem is that in case of a single supplier a 
complementary pricing strategy may be pursued, meaning that the core product 
supplied is well-priced but related products are comparatively expensive. (Cf. id., 
p.151) 
 
Quantity or availability 
Yet another motive to terminate an established supplier-buyer relationship is 
represented by incorrect delivery concerning quantity and timing. The resulting 
unavailability can be traced back to increases in demand, ill-conceived processes, 
uncertain output in case of agricultural or natural goods, etc. It may happen 
temporarily, regularly or permanently. (Cf. Verduijn, 2004, p.134) 
 
Quality and performance 
Whereas variations in quality and poor performance are obvious motives to switch the 
supplier, the relative performance can be the trigger of such a change already. In this 
case, the incumbent fulfils the agreement with the buying company but cannot keep up 
with competitors. (Cf. id., p.134f.) It has to be emphasised that absent competition 
resulting from the dependence on one single supplier can be identified as an incentive 
for a worsening performance. (Cf. Heijboer, 2003, p.151) 
 
New technologies 
Not-gained access to new technologies by the present supplier marks another motive 
to conclude a contract with a new one. To keep up-to-date in this regard is essential in 
the present economic environment which is characterised by volatile, fast changing and 
diverse requirements. (Cf. Verduijn, 2004, p.134) It has to be highlighted that single 
sourcing is frequently linked to a lack of innovation propensity in related economic 
literature. (Cf. Heijboer, 2003, p.151) 
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Alternative components 
A new supplier has to be found in case of modified components and materials needed 
due to changing product designs and client preferences if the old supplier is not able or 
willing to deliver or develop. (Cf. Verduijn, 2004, p.134) 
 
The bankruptcy of a supplying company, a general negative assessment of a supplier 
and the discovery of a better source are further reasons leading to the termination of a 
supplier-buyer relationship and, in the course of its development, to the replacement of 
a provider. Generally, it has to be distinguished between reasons being in the sphere of 
the buyer and those being not. Referring to bankruptcy, surveys of practitioners have 
shown that this is a frequently occurring cause, reflecting the general economic 
development. In fact, the unpredictability of such an event can influence the whole 
switching process. The buyer might even have to support the new supplier to a greater 
extent as an effective alternative has to be on hand as fast as possible. (Cf. Arnold, 
2007, p.221f.) 
 
2.1.2 Contingencies creating a need for switching 
 
In the course of a theoretical examination, it is hardly possible to determine when 
supplier switching should take place as it would be necessary to know the particular 
conditions surrounding the concerned company. (Cf. Verduijn, 2004, p.135) Therefore, 
the focus has to be on “the contingencies or product, process or industry 
characteristics that may create or trigger a need for switching” (Ibid.). 
 
A basic overview of the numerous contingencies that induce the need to switch the 
supplier is given by Verduijn (2004): “The contingencies triggering the need for 
switching include the introduction of new products […], technological change […], 
unique customer orders or high variation in customer orders […], high level of 
specialisation in an industry […]; diverse, complex and widely distributed inputs […], 
and price fluctuations. […] Several contingencies that influence the frequency in which 
a need for switching is created: the rate of technological change […]; the length of 
product life cycles […], the rate of change in customer preferences […]; and the rate 
and sizes of change in demand volumes. Finally, […] contingencies contributing to the 
urgency for a switch to take place include the levels of price and time based 
competition.” (Id., p.137) The appearance of one of these contingencies does not 
necessarily suffice to provoke the need for switching. (Cf. ibid.) 
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2.2 The easiness of switching 
 
A large number of factors influencing the easiness of switching can be identified. In the 
following, a range of such factors will be introduced, accompanied by corresponding 
descriptions to facilitate understanding. Since this subject matter can be examined from 
various perspectives, partial overlaps may be observed occasionally. 
 
2.2.1 Influencing factors related to the different 
sourcing strategies 
 
At first, attention will be paid to those factors connected with the different possible 
sourcing strategies. 
The supplier strategy is associated with the quantity of suppliers available for a good 
demanded. One may differentiate between sole, single, dual and multiple sourcing. The 
former constitutes a monopolistic situation, with one supplier only being able to deliver 
the desired supply object. If, out of a group of potential providers, one supplier has 
been selected, single sourcing has been executed. Dual sourcing denotes delivery by 
two suppliers, multiple sourcing delivery by more than two. The easiness of switching is 
affected by the number of suppliers used by a buyer. At least one alternative being 
disposable can serve as the preliminary buffer until the right choice has been made. 
(Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.28) 
Within the supply-object strategy, the focus is on the complexity of the supplied product 
and, in particular, on the distinction between unit, modular and system sourcing. Being 
supplied with simple designed goods which thus are not complex is classified as unit 
sourcing. Modular sourcing is on hand when the sourced object represents an 
independent module of the purchaser’s final product and is characterised by a higher 
degree of complexity. In case of system sourcing, the supplier is fully responsible for 
the development of the entire system. Concerning switching, inter-organisational 
complexity can be traced back to goods with complex design and comprehensive 
development responsibility on the part of the supplier. It leads to raised interaction and 
adjustments in the supplier-buyer relationship. Therefore, the difficulty of replacing a 
supplier increases with the rising complexity of the product design. (Cf. id., p.28f.) 
The different supply-frequency strategies are stock, demand-tailored and just-in-time 
sourcing. In case of the former, the purchase is carried out in advance. Here, a 
comparatively large average stock can be observed. Demand-tailored sourcing is used 
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when no fixed demand pattern is identifiable and the pursued objective is a reduced 
inventory. The latter is characterised by a reduction of the inventory to a minimum 
level. This can be obtained “through a synchronization of supply and demand as well 
as a pull-oriented provision of materials” (Id., p.29). If the purchasing company decides 
in favour of this strategy, particular adjustments have to be made and information has 
to be exchanged between the concerned members of the supply chain in order to 
achieve an unproblematic supply process. Here, the risk of disruptions and supply-
sided problems is higher as hardly any buffers are available. Therefore, switching 
poses a greater challenge the more sophisticated supply frequency is. (Cf. ibid.) 
In the course of the supply-subject strategy, buyers decide between individual and 
cooperative sourcing. As the name implies, single sourcing describes the situation of 
exclusive procurement being connected with the purchaser’s abandonment of 
economies of scale and scope. If cooperative sourcing is used, the objective of, for 
example, lower prices will be pursued with the help of joint sourcing. The pursuit of this 
second strategy and the exploitation of the associated economies of scale can lead to 
a complication of switching due to the integration of further organisations. Again, 
additional adjustments concerning the sourcing partners are necessary, leading to 
increased complexity concerning the replacement of the incumbent. (Cf. ibid.) 
Referring to technology, a distinction has to be made between electronic and manual 
sourcing. Whereas the former is characterised by the usage of advanced information 
technology (such as e-auctions and websites operated by suppliers), this does not 
apply to the latter. It has to be considered that the complexity of switching can be 
increased or decreased by the use of IT. An increase can be traced back to special 
technology used in the old supplier-buyer relationship which should, in a similar way, 
also be available in the new one. This results in a more complicated replacement 
process. In contrast, a decrease can be achieved by using different kinds of e-sourcing 
which facilitate the comparison of potential suppliers and thereby possibly encourage 
the supplier change. (Cf. id., p.29f.) 
The ultimate strategy is related to the supply market the purchasing company acts in. 
Here, it has to be distinguished between local and global sourcing. In case of the latter, 
the buyer has the opportunity to choose from a greater number of alternative suppliers 
making better offers in matters of price, quality and/or technology. This facilitates the 
search for an appropriate supplier. On the other hand, problems that hamper supplier 
switching may arise in the course of the integration process due to cultural diversity 
and geographical dissonances. (Cf. id., p.30) 
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2.2.2 Conditions of the specific switching environment 
 
Next, four conditions associated with the switching environment will be examined which 
influence the easiness of switching in a significant way as well. Their examination 
enables companies to assess the practicability of a contemplated switch. (Cf. id., 
p.168f.) 
Relationship-specific investments are closely linked with the complexity factor of 
switching, causing interconnections between the supply partners. The stronger these 
interconnections are, the more complicated is the termination of the current 
relationship. This can be traced back to the enhanced complexity which, in turn, can be 
attributed to the fact that an increased number of interrelationships has to be 
considered. (Cf. id., p.168) 
High dependency of the purchasing company within a supplier-buyer relationship leads 
to an exacerbated process of switching. This can mainly be attributed to behavioural 
risks such as adverse selection, hidden action and hidden intention. There is a strong 
risk that the supplier will try to exploit the purchaser’s dependency. He is likely to 
increase switching costs in order to prevent from switching. This can be seen as a 
momentary solution only since it earns him a bad reputation and minimises his chances 
of future business with the outgoing partner. (Cf. ibid.) 
The greater the number of potential suppliers being at the command of the purchaser, 
the better his bargaining power and the higher the probability of being successful by 
detecting a better distributor. From this it follows that the easiness of switching 
increases with the possibility of choosing from a bigger group of feasible suppliers. (Cf. 
ibid.) 
Switching costs have a strong impact on the decision to replace the incumbent supplier 
in matters of risk level and feasibility. Economically seen, it is quite likely that there is 
no point in switching in case of high switching costs. Depending on their amount, an 
appropriate period has to be taken into account until the purchaser profits from the 
better performance of the entrant. Thus, the switching success is characterised by 
increasing uncertainty since the occurrence of unpredictable circumstances has to be 
considered and an early termination of the new relationship has to be anticipated. If the 
mentioned costs exceed a certain situational amount, it is worthwhile to think about 
whether it would be more advantageous to improve the actual supplier-buyer 
relationship than to switch. Due to the great impact of switching costs on the decision 
to replace an incumbent supplier, this topic will be taken up again later on. (Cf. id., 
p.169) 
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2.2.3 Influencing factors related to the design decisions 
of a supply chain 
 
The following chapter takes up the matter of those influencing factors related to the 
design decisions that have to be made in a supply chain, namely governance, choice of 
actors, coordination and processes. This connection is based on the fact that the 
activities associated with switching cannot be reduced to the choice of the new supplier 
and contract negotiations. Beyond, “activities related to supply channel design, 
implementation and operation, and finally dissolution of the temporary cooperation” 
(Verduijn, 2004, p.296) have to be added. The decisions mentioned above are an 
integral part of switching; a closer look at these will be taken below. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
2.2.3.1 Governance 
 
Factors having an impact on “the easiness of establishing an effective governance 
structure” (Id., p.142) are uncertainty of transaction/asset specificity, network 
governance, trust and power. 
In market governance, switching to new suppliers can take place without great effort 
and at low cost. Therefore, its easiness can be considered as very high. (Cf. id., p.140) 
Increased risk in the course of procurement on the market can be traced back to 
market imperfections to which companies respond with the pursuing of resource 
dependency strategies. These induce stable relationships and a reduction of the 
easiness of switching as can be observed when applying the resource based strategy. 
(Cf. id., p.276) 
If specific assets are necessary for the production of supply objects and in case of 
highly uncertain business environments regarding outcome or transaction continuity, 
safeguards are used in order to protect the buyer’s individual interests. Although their 
creation raises transaction costs, a reduction can be achieved by network governance 
or greater trust within the supplier-buyer relationship. (Cf. id., p.141) In case of the 
former, social mechanisms help to exchange information concerning the actors and the 
fear of sanctions and a bad reputation makes opportunistic behaviour less attractive. 
As a consequence, a decrease of transaction costs and a raise of the easiness can be 
observed. (Cf. id., p.276) 
If neither network governance nor trust is existent, there has to be trust at the very 
beginning of a new endeavour. (Cf. id., p.141) Trust is essential in a supplier-buyer 
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relationship but a major bottleneck concerning the quick development of a supply 
channel. (Cf. id., p.276) It showed “that in networks with frequent transactions and 
switching trust develops and supports easiness of switching” (Ibid.). An alternative to 
protect its own interests could be to exercise power over the involved with the result of 
making switching more difficult for them. (Cf. id., p.141) 
 
2.2.3.2 Choice of actors 
 
The easiness of selecting suppliers is influenced by “uncertainty in the specification of 
the needs and requirements, availability of actors and market structure, and availability 
and assessment of actor information” (Ibid.). 
The difficulty level of switching parallels the degree of complexity in the course of 
procurement. Not surprisingly, it showed that uncertainty is higher in case of 
purchasing new supply objects or from a new supplier compared to a straight rebuy 
(Cf. id., p.142) and that information retrieval and supplier choice is more challenging 
when being a matter of specialised goods. (Cf. id., p.271) A positive influence on the 
easiness can be discovered if the products demanded are clearly specified and 
standardised within the concerned sector. (Cf. id., p.273) 
Market structures characterised by a large number of actors available provide more 
opportunities in making the right choice. In contrast, selection tends to be more 
complex in case of markets which are monopolistic or which have to deal with highly 
specialised goods or in case of products which require close integration and 
collaboration as fewer providers are available then. (Cf. id., p.142) Additionally, the risk 
of latecomers has to be noted, meaning that there are few potential providers available 
and that the demanded supply objects are rare or even preliminary unobtainable. (Cf. 
id., p.273) 
The easiness of switching depends on the amount of information available and how 
reliable this information is. In the rather unlikely case of perfect information, the 
evaluation of potential partners would be relatively easy, the greatest value generating 
one could be chosen then. The use of IT and e-market places raises information 
availability and lowers transaction costs at the same time. Furthermore, network 
governance diminishes the necessity of assessing each supposable supply chain 
partner as it leads to a reduction of the risk of adverse selection. (Cf. id., p.142) 
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2.2.3.3 Coordination 
 
Switching is more time-consuming and complex “in case of high levels of task 
uncertainty, close coupling or high interdependency of the activities, high levels of 
complexity, a large work unit size and high levels of functional diversity” (Id., p.276). 
This calls for more complexity and elaboration in the matter of coordination. In the 
following, modularity and standards, network coordinator/-broker, information and 
communication technologies, routines, common knowledge and experience and 
proximity will be described. These factors make coordination easier. (Cf. ibid.) 
The necessity for coordination is lowered when modular processes are created. 
“Modularity in processes reduces the amount of coordination that is required between 
these processes.” (Id., p.144) Coordination cannot be turned down completely though. 
(Cf. ibid.) 
Establishing a network broker is another way of facilitating the generation of a supply 
channel and the coordination between the members within a network. (Cf. id., p.279) 
But its usage has to be seen critically since there is the danger of letting the network 
broker become a too powerful actor. (Cf. id., p.145) 
As discussed before, the severity of switching can be influenced to a great extent by 
information and communication technology which encourages transparency and 
connectivity. Still, the application of electronic integration is double-edged. On the one 
hand, it leads to a decrease of the easiness due to the fact that its establishment can 
be expensive. But, on the other hand, if time critical tasks have to be coordinated, it 
comes along with a rising easiness. 
In the course of time routine and experience develop in regard to switching which 
mainly accelerate the switching process. (Cf. id., p.279) 
Referring to proximity, the view is held that modular supply chains are characterised by 
a low geographical and cultural proximity. From this it follows that low proximity is an 
indicator for the modularity of supply chains. This results in the fact that high easiness 
can be observed in such a supply chain more frequently. On the other hand, proximity 
is not seen as a sufficient reference to modularity or easiness. (Cf. id., p.277) In fact, 
proximity can increase as well as decrease the easiness of switching. For example, in 
case of high geographical proximity, the former can be found since fast reactions are 
possible. (Cf. id., p.279) 
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2.2.3.4 Processes 
 
The time spent and the degree of effort that is necessary to make the required 
adjustments concerning processes, resources and distribution have an impact on the 
easiness of switching. The influencing factors are resource flexibility, modularity and 
coordination flexibility, 3-Dimensional Concurrent Engineering and availability of 
resources. (Cf. id., p.281) 
Resource flexibility means that a wider range of tasks can be performed with the 
existent resources or that its capacity can be increased. Highly flexible resources make 
switching easier. 
In case of modularity and coordination flexibility, processes can be recombined in 
different sequences. Processes can be described as highly flexible if there is the 
possibility to use identical resources and processes at distinct locations and in distinct 
sequences. (Cf. id., p.279) It shows that “in supply networks with a high level of supply 
chain integration, specialised products and resources or immature products or 
processes, the easiness of switching is low” (Id., p.282). 
3-Dimensional Concurrent Engineering can mainly be observed in industries 
characterised by a high degree of product and technical innovations where new 
processes or resources are necessary. (Cf. ibid.) Its concept is that a lowering of the 
time to market can be achieved when resources and processes as well as the product 
and the supply chain will be designed and adjusted simultaneously. (Cf. id., p.145) 
A positive relation exists between the availability of resources and the easiness of 
switching. Switching is more complex if the resources needed cannot be procured 
comparatively quickly. (Cf. id., p.280) 
 
2.3 The balancing of the need for and the 
easiness of switching 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the organisational strategies which are brought on 
by the need for and the easiness of switching. “The balance between the need for 
switching and the easiness of switching finally leads to the switching behaviour of 
organisations”. (Id., p.149) 
The capabilities and flexibilities of companies being members of a supply chain are 
closely related with the easiness of switching. An increase of the strategic flexibility 
happens in case of a high level of difficulty regarding switching. The organisations 
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attempt to have flexible channels in order to fulfil the requirements of new customers, 
to offer certain product designs, etc. Here, the objective is to have the lowest need for 
switching possible. 
Companies acting in a volatile environment are aware of the fact that situations making 
a supplier switch necessary do occur. Therefore, they are favourably disposed towards 
collaborating with other organisations closely despite the possibility of changing the 
market or moving to new products is restricted and that switching becomes more 
costly. Here, the pursued strategy of organisations participating in a network is “to 
select a type and level of flexibility internally and within the current channel” (Id., p.147) 
and at the same time to create mechanisms that lead to a facilitation of switching. 
These mechanisms refer to, for example, the development of industry standards in 
matters of exchange of information, processes and products. 
The type of strategy that is pursued to a great extent depends on the current situation 
and the industry the organisation acts in. (Cf. id., p.146f.) 
The need for as well as the easiness of switching may be high or low, leading to 
different situations and reactions on the part of the concerned company. This can be 
illustrated by the situation matrix displayed below (Cf. id., p.298): 
 
Figure 1: Situation matrix 
Source: Verduijn, 2004, p.297 
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chain. If switching is comparatively easy, companies replace their current suppliers to 
buy lower-priced materials or to gain insight in the offers of alternative providers. 
In case of a high need for switching, demand, products and processes or supplying 
sources are characterised by frequent changes occurring unpredictably and 
simultaneously. Then, the adaptation of supply channels has to take place quickly. If 
the easiness of switching can be classified as high, organisations are used to switch 
and to adapt their channels regularly and are equipped to that effect. Here, it is a 
matter of a dynamic supply network. 
In case of a high need but a low easiness, the organisation’s situation can be described 
as problematic. Switching would lead to sufficient flexibility but the organisation is not 
able to react quickly to environmental changes due to barriers of organisational or 
economic nature. There are two options to avoid such situations: (1.) a reduction of the 
need for switching or (2.) an increase of the easiness of switching. The former can be 
accomplished by an extension of the internal, supply chain or supply channel flexibility 
or a give-up of risky products and a retreat from risky markets. The latter can be 
achieved through collaboration with organisations acting in the same industry. (Cf. 
ibid.) 
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3 Phases of supplier switching 
 
According to the systematisation drawn up by Phillip Kirst in his dissertation ‘Switching 
Integrated Suppliers - A multiple case analysis of supplier switches in an industrial 
context’ (2008), companies have to pass through specific phases in the course of a 
supplier switch. In particular, Kirst distinguishes 
1. “the supplier-switching decision phase, 
2. the supplier-switching execution phase, and 
3. the supplier-switch success evaluation phase” (Kirst, 2008, p.110). 
Taking up Kirst’s categorisation, the statements in this chapter are mainly based on his 
work. To be responsive to this topic is important insofar as “a comprehensive picture of 
the supplier-switching phenomenon [can be gained] through an analysis of these 
different phases, their managerial areas and activities, descriptions of certain events 
within the phases, and the interrelation of their elements” (Ibid.). 
 
The social exchange theory, transaction cost economics and the relational view have 
been brought together in order to facilitate the explanation of the reasons for and the 
motivations of replacing an incumbent supplier and to evaluate how successful an 
executed switch is. The first-mentioned theory forms the basis “by comparing outputs 
of a current relationship with the expectations one had before entering the liaison, and 
potential alternative outcomes with other partners” (Id., p.109). Its purpose is to gain 
knowledge regarding change and stability in a supplier-buyer relationship. The two 
latter theories will be used for the assessment of the mentioned outcomes. In 
particular, relational efforts connected with transaction cost economics will be 
subtracted from relational rewards associated with the relational view. “Depending on 
the realized outcomes, the disengager1 might experience dissatisfaction, which leads 
to switching tendencies”. (Ibid.) When making the definite decision to switch, switching 
costs as well as the costs of supplier development have to be taken into account. (Cf. 
id., p.108f.) 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Disengager names the initiator of the supplier switch which, in the work at hand, is the buying company. 
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3.1 Supplier-switching decision phase 
 
The supplier-switching decision phase constitutes the first phase in the course of a 
supplier switch. Temporally allocated before the actual decision, the following steps 
have to be taken: 
(a) the identification of a supplier weakness on the part of the purchasing company 
through an evaluation of the disengager’s satisfaction with the current supplier-
buyer relationship, 
(b) the decision either to pursue the loyalty, voice or exit strategy and,  
(c) in case of deciding in favour of the exit strategy, the final decision to switch. (Cf. 
id., p.111) 
 
3.1.1 Activities 
 
At first, the activities being part of the supplier-switching decision phase will be 
discussed in order to get an initial overview. 
The first group of activities comprises all actions which aim at the improvement of the 
established supplier’s performance and are in connection with the below described 
voice strategy. These activities will be mentioned for the sake of completeness only 
since they are outside of the topic examined in the work at hand. 
The two further groups of activities “are related to the process steps of supplier 
selection […] and comprise the activities of supplier identification, supplier delimitation, 
supplier pre-selection, supplier negotiation and supplier selection” (Id., p.176). One 
group aims at the finding of an appropriate new supplier. This can be proceeded as 
follows: The purchasing company can do supply market research, can fall back on 
present suppliers which deliver another object needed or becomes aware of other 
supplying companies as a result of their marketing activities. The other group’s purpose 
is to verify the performance of a potential new supplier. In this case, the buyer mainly 
uses self-disclosure representing a cost-efficient possibility to obtain the necessary 
information and on-site assessment. (Cf. id., p.36, p.176f.) 
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3.1.2 Supplier weaknesses 
 
Supplier weaknesses can be identified as causes for switching the incumbent supplier. 
A distinction has to be made between two different forms, namely an absolute and a 
relative supplier weakness. The latter appears when an alternative supplier performs 
better in areas such as price, quality or service. In contrast, the former can be identified 
when the incumbent supplier’s performance in the above mentioned areas is 
decreasing compared to his present one. In response to the identification of such 
weaknesses, loyalty, voice or exit strategy may be selected by the purchasing 
company. (Cf. id., p.57) 
These weaknesses result from negative triggers such as “quality decline, availability 
and attractiveness of alternatives, decreased exit barriers, likelihood of success of 
voice, perceived value of product and services, buyer’s loyalty, and strategic fit” (Id., 
p.61). Additionally, it has to be distinguished between triggers and the final switching 
motivation. The former typify incidents that cause activities which eventually lead to exit 
or voice. In contrast, the latter rather corresponds to more general supplier 
weaknesses (the different motive categories have already been discussed in Chapter 
2.1.1). Thus, a buyer is motivated to replace an incumbent supplier when existing 
triggers stimulate such a category to a certain extent. 
Supplier switching must not necessarily be an immediately emerging consequence of 
triggers appearing. In fact, it is common that the concerned supplier will be warned or 
that the disengager will try to improve his performance. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
3.1.3 Loyalty, voice or exit strategy 
 
Dissatisfaction concerning the incumbent supplier’s performance on the part of the 
disengager arises if the requested and available capabilities do not coincide and 
cannot be balanced within an appropriate period of time and at competitive costs. In 
such a situation a supplier weakness is existent. In answer to this, the buyer can 
decide in favour of loyalty, voice or exit strategy. (Cf. id., p.57) 
By pursuing the loyalty strategy, the buying firm accepts the poor performance of his 
supplier. The whole situation remains unchanged then. 
When deciding for the voice strategy, the buyer stays with the previous supplier, both 
trying to improve the situation. This can be carried out through an adjustment of the 
performance or by changing the requirements for the relationship. The latter refers to a 
modification of its terms and conditions through a renegotiation. One positive aspect of 
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the voice strategy is that no switching costs arise. Still, if the performance should be 
amended, resources of the purchasing company have to be used and opportunity costs 
resulting from the weak performance have to be accepted. Additionally, there is the 
opportunity to incorporate a further supplier. This can be advantageous in terms of 
knowledge and capacity but is connected with higher effort regarding coordination and, 
possibly, extra fixed costs. 
Making a decision in favour of the third alternative, the exit strategy, is linked to the 
termination of the old supplier-buyer relationship and the beginning of a new one. Here, 
a further option would be to revert to insourcing instead of using an external source of 
supply. However, this will not be considered since it is outside of the subject area 
addressed here. (Cf. id., pp.57-59) 
 
3.1.4 Evaluation of the buyer’s satisfaction 
 
In accordance to the social exchange theory, the evaluation of the outcome of a current 
supplier-buyer relationship on the part of the disengager can be carried out with the 
expected comparison level ( expCL ) and the comparison level of alternatives ( altCL ). 
The former represents the minimum outcome to be expected of such a relationship. A 
comparison of this minimum with the real outcome has to be made. The latter indicates 
the best external payoffs to be achieved with alternative suppliers. It is therefore a good 
indicator of whether a relationship should be stopped or not. A comparison with the 
realised outcome of the actual relationship leads to the following: The maintenance of 
the relationship takes place, and thus no necessity to switch the supplier accrues when 
the realised outcome is greater than altCL . In case the contrary is observed, 
dissatisfaction arises, accompanied by the tendency to change the supplier. 
To summarise, with the help of these comparison levels, the outcome of an established 
relationship can be evaluated, and, consequently, the satisfaction of the disengager 
and the stability of the relationship be determined. (Cf. id., p.97f.) 
 
As noted above, the relational rewards and efforts have been integrated into the social 
exchange theory. This results in the following definitions: 
“Real outcome (Outcome) = real relational rewards - real relational efforts 
Expected comparison level ( expCL ) = expected relational reward - expected 
relational efforts 
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Comparison level alternative ( altCL ) = estimated relational reward alternative - 
estimated relational efforts alternative” (Id., p.106) 
 
The comparison of rewards and efforts of a relationship between a buyer and his 
supplier results in a particular degree of satisfaction. The qualification of this degree will 
be carried out by comparing the present relationship with another one. Thus, 
satisfaction depends on the relationship between expected and actual outcome in the 
course of an exchange relationship as well as the potential outcome which could be 
achieved when an alternative supplying company was to be utilised. The figure below 
illustrates how the buyer’s satisfaction degree can be determined and how it can be 
enhanced through the pursuit of the loyalty, exit or voice strategy. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
 
Figure 2: Satisfaction evaluation and resulting strategies 
Source: Kirst, 2008, p.107 
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relationship will be analysed. For this purpose, the following calculation will be used: 
The estimated relational efforts of the alternative will be subtracted from the 
corresponding rewards. If the outcome to be gained in collaboration with the new 
supplier is higher than the former one, switching tendencies will arise. This would be a 
matter of a relative supplier weakness. 
Furthermore, the choice of the strategy pursued by the buyer (exit or voice strategy) is 
influenced by the switching costs (here named as exit costs) as well as the so-called 
cost of voice expressing the development costs of the supplier. In case the satisfaction 
degree of the disengager can be enhanced by both strategies (shown by 3., 4. and 5. 
in Figure 2), a consideration of the costs of switching and of supplier development 
might help to come to the right decision. 
In conclusion, it can be implied that the tendencies to switch are associated with the 
dissatisfaction of the buying company. In addition, one should not forget that the costs 
of both exit and voice strategy should be incorporated into a decision to switch. 
Furthermore, dissatisfaction is associated with the two types of supplier weaknesses. 
(Cf. id., p.106f.) 
Should the real outcome be below the one expected and another supplier able to 
provoke improvements, a matter of an absolute supplier weakness is at hand. Here, 
not the fact that the disengager’s expectations are not met is decisive but the existence 
of another supplier offering a better estimated outcome than the incumbent. The lower 
real outcome can be traced back to “smaller rewards and the same expected amount 
of effort, […] higher efforts and the same level of rewards, or a combination of the two 
developments in such a way that a shortfall occurs” (Id., p.107). 
In case of a relative supplier weakness, the real outcome is consistent with the 
expected one. Still, there is an alternative supplier on hand being able to provide a 
better one. (Cf. ibid.) This superior outcome can be traced back “to higher rewards and 
the same effort as in the old exchange relationship, […] lower efforts and the same 
level of rewards, or a combination [of] the two developments in a way that the surplus 
occurs” (Id., p.107f.). 
 
3.2 Supplier-switching execution phase 
 
Being the next step in the course of a supplier switch, the supplier-switching execution 
phase starts with the first activity connected with the disengagement from the 
incumbent supplier. (Cf. id., p.80) The major tasks in this phase are 
(a) the planning, 
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(b) the steering and 
(c) the monitoring of the supplier switch. 
These activities may help to guarantee a smooth switching process and become more 
difficult the higher the integration degree of the old supplier is. (Cf. id., p.195) This 
phase is finished as soon as the new supplier performs at the expected level and the 
relationship with the former supplier has been terminated (or continues in a reduced 
form). (Cf. id., p.80) 
 
3.2.1 Planning 
 
The initial point of this phase is the planning of the switch. Here, the disengager selects 
the switching strategy and hence decides how to terminate the old supplier-buyer 
relationship and to integrate the new supplier. This is done in addition to the 
anticipation of problems that might occur and the provision of a guideline to facilitate 
the switching process and to reach the targets set. (Cf. ibid.) The switching strategy 
comprises the dissolution and the integration strategy. These strategies have to be 
defined by the buyer after identifying a supplier weakness and making the switching 
decision. (Cf. id., p.60) 
The dissolution strategy deals with the degree of egoism and frankness which 
determine the behaviour of the buyer towards the old supplier. In both cases, extreme 
positions might be taken up, namely, referring to egoism, other and self-orientation 
and, referring to frankness, direct and indirect communication. In reference to direct 
and indirect communication, the difference is whether the termination of the present 
supplier-buyer relationship is pronounced explicitly or not. Finally, distinct strategies 
arise depending on the taken positions. (Cf. id., p.59) 
The integration strategy is connected to activities concerning the entrant supplier. More 
precisely, it is a matter of how the new supplier-buyer relationship will be implemented 
and operated. (Cf. id., p.60) The different integration strategies result from the intensity 
of support on the part of the disengager and the amount of specific investments. This 
leads to differing integration degrees. (Cf. id., p.46f.) 
To systemise the activities associated with a supplier switch, reference is made to the 
relational layer approach. (Cf. id., p.75) This approach distinguishes “the institutional, 
financial, operational, informational and social layers” (Ibid.) which are related to all 
actors involved in switching: the buyer, the old and the new supplier as well as further 
concerned actors like, for instance, customers or other involved organisations. (Cf. id., 
p.71) “These layers […] can be seen as areas of managerial activity for the disengager 
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during the course of supplier switches”. (Id., p.75) In the following, the five relational 
layers as well as their role with regard to switching will be examined. (Cf. ibid.) 
The parts of the institutional layer are legal as well as formal connections which exist 
between exchange partners and determine their responsibilities. The former are 
contractual agreements such as detailed exit clauses which should regulate and 
facilitate the termination of a business relationship with a supplier. Lawsuit actions, 
asset division and contracting are examples of activities which belong to this layer and 
are of particular importance concerning switching. 
The flow of money between members of a supplier-buyer relationship and interrelations 
with financial institutions are related to the financial layer. Referring to switching, this 
layer is important in matters of compensation claims of both parties, adjustments of 
payment transactions and determination of costs associated with supplier weaknesses 
and a switch. 
“The operational layer captures the degree to which systems, procedures, and routines 
of the buying and selling organizations are linked to facilitate operations and support 
the flow of physical goods. Operational linkages can be systemized by referring to 
company functions, like logistics, production, distribution, or development.” (Id., p.76) 
Concerning the replacement of a supplier, this layer gains importance since a smooth 
running of the change is essential in order to avoid disruptions in production. The 
preoccupation with, for example, safety stocks, product design and potential problems 
related to logistics, production and distribution beforehand helps to identify arising 
challenges and create appropriate countermeasures. 
As the name implies, the informational layer refers to the information transfer between 
buying and supplying parties. More precisely, it relates to what kind of and how 
information is being transferred. With reference to switching, the main focus is on the 
adopted communication strategy. The plan to switch can be communicated directly or 
indirectly, a long time in advance or rather on short notice, oral or written but also with 
the help of indications like a price rise. The chosen way influences the management 
steps taken. (Cf. id., p.76f.) Being of great importance for the performance of the new 
supplier, the sharing of knowledge within the previous exchange relationship has to be 
considered as another highly significant factor. (Cf. id., p.185) 
The social layer involves personal relationships that existed in the old supplier-buyer 
relationship and have to be built up in the new one. This includes the degree of 
friendship and liking between the exchange partners. A strong social linkage leads to a 
longer maintenance of an established relationship but also to inertness in the run-up to 
a switching decision. The latter may result in a later initiation of countermeasures in 
case of discovered performance weaknesses on the part of the supplier or in extending 
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the time span up to which the performance of the new supplier surpasses that of the 
previous one. (Cf. id., p.77) 
 
3.2.2 Steering 
 
The task of steering the activities connected with the change of a supplier can be 
handled in different ways. A frequently used possibility would be to form cross-
functional teams assigned with the processing. These teams often consist of members 
of inner-organisational departments such as the purchasing department and quality 
insurance, the team leader originating from the former in most cases. Additionally, it is 
quite common that the new supplying organisation builds such a team itself to make 
communication easier. (Cf. id., p.181) 
 
3.2.3 Monitoring 
 
The final task in this phase is represented by the monitoring of the supplier switch. 
Carried out in a useful way, the buyer can take corrective action or adapt the plans at 
the very first appearance of deviations from the planned outcome of an activity. (Cf. id., 
p.111) The data gathered in the course of monitoring is to be used in the supplier-
switch success evaluation phase in order to evaluate how successful the supplier 
switch was. (Cf. id., p.187) 
 
3.3 Supplier-switch success evaluation phase 
 
Being the last phase in the course of a supplier switch, the supplier-switch success 
evaluation phase can be seen as the finalisation of the whole process. (Cf. id., p.112) It 
starts as soon as the new supplying organisation has reached the expected level of 
performance and the old supplier-buyer relationship has been terminated completely or 
reduced. (Cf. id., p.206) 
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3.3.1 Evaluating the switching success 
 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the social exchange theory, transaction 
cost economics and the relational view are jointly used to evaluate how successful a 
performed switch has been. A closer look at this issue will be taken in the following. 
When doing so, three different success categories will be measured in order to obtain a 
more differentiated and disaggregated evaluation. (Cf. id., p.108) 
The evaluation procedure is as follows: The outcome of the newly formed supplier-
buyer relationship is the result of the new supplier’s performance. For the assessment 
of the switching success, comparison levels are used by the buyer. The outcome 
resulting from the relationship with the former supplier serves as the comparison level 
of the alternative ( altCL ). The usage of the previous supplier’s performance as the 
basis of comparison can be traced back to the fact that a mould-breaking supplier has 
no relevance right after a switch has been performed. This may change when some 
time has passed and when the buyer takes other supplying companies into 
consideration again. The expected comparison level ( expCL ) arises out of the old altCL . 
This highlights the buying company’s expectations regarding the new trade relationship 
prior to the replacement of the supplier. As there is a relation between these 
expectations and “certain economic, technological and switching-related objectives” 
(Id., p.193), the new expCL  will be used by the disengager to check whether the 
switching goals have been achieved. The success evaluation can be initiated as soon 
as the determination of the actual relationship’s outcome and of the comparison levels 
has been completed. A switch can be labelled as successful if the buyer’s performance 
and his competitive position is enhanced. (Cf. ibid.) Or, in more detail: “A vendor 
replacement is successful if the outcome of the alternative supplier-buyer relationship 
( altCL ) is as big as expected prior to the switch, bigger, or at least bigger than the 
outcome […] of the old supplier-buyer relationship.” (Id., p.192) Consequentially, the 
minimum level of switching success is achieved when the performance of the new 
supplying source surpasses that of the old one. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
3.3.2 Switching success dimensions 
 
In the following, the different dimensions of switching success will be considered. (Cf. 
id., p.108) 
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Economic success 
As economic reasons act as the main initiators of switching in most cases, this 
dimension is of great importance to decide whether a performed switch has been 
successful in terms of saved money, higher earnings and a raised market share. 
Therefore, the economic success can be seen as the key dimension in this context. 
(Cf. ibid.) “Thus, the means of economic success (lower cost, higher revenues) 
influence the relational reward and the relational effort of the Outcome, expCL , and 
altCL .” (Ibid.) 
 
Technological success 
Determining the technological success can be carried out with the help of measures 
associated with relational rewards like the degree of innovative dynamic, increased and 
further patent registrations, improved quality, etc. (Cf. ibid.) “Relational efforts in 
regards to technological issues essentially reflect a deterioration of certain 
characteristics of the supply object or the process in comparison to the old supplier-
buyer relationship. However, the worsening of certain elements might be 
counterbalanced by improvements of economic factors.” (Ibid.) 
 
Switching-related success 
The measures determining the switching-related success can be assigned to relational 
rewards and efforts, including, amongst others, the length of the whole switching 
process, the switching costs, the achievement of strategic objectives and rather less 
weighty factors such as the atmosphere between concerned organisations and 
coordination problems. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
Two measures connected with the switching-related success have to be considered 
separately due to their particular influence on the success of switching: the switching 
costs on the one, the time needed to perform the entire switching process on the other 
side. Their estimation is carried out in the forefront of the switch, having an impact on 
the advantageousness of altCL  ahead of the supplier change. As stated before, altCL  
turns into expCL  post-switching whereas the real costs of switching and the real time 
needed will have an effect on the outcome resulting from the newly formed relationship. 
Accordingly, a great impact on the success can be led back to the time needed and the 
achieved switching costs. This applies regardless of the achievement of the 
preassigned objectives which symbolise the buyer’s expectations regarding the 
relationship with the new supplier and are included in the ex ante altCL . (Cf. id., 
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p.198f.) “The expectations can be organized along certain success dimensions that are 
related to the economic and technological performance of the new supplier, and to the 
achievement of certain strategic goals incorporated in the switching-related success 
dimension. To summarize, it can be stated that if all the objectives and expectations in 
the economic, technological, and switching-related (including strategic objectives) 
success dimensions have been accomplished at the anticipated time and cost, the 
supplier switch can be deemed successful.” (Id., p.199) 
 
3.3.3 The overall switching success 
 
The three success dimensions’ results put together constitute the overall switching 
success which indicates the degree of satisfaction of the buying company following an 
executed switch. (Cf. id., p.191) The achievement of targets set in economic, 
technological and strategic areas is not synonymous with increasing the buyer’s 
competitiveness though. In fact, the process of switching has to be efficient as a whole. 
In case this applies, economic value can be created and a competitive advantage be 
established. (Cf. id., p.10) It is important to keep in mind that the interpretation of the 
overall success has to be carried out with caution. For this purpose, the individual 
dimensions will be examined separately. For a better understanding, the aforesaid will 
be clarified with the following example: If the buyer’s aim is to diminish the dependence 
on the incumbent supplier and achieves this through a supplier switch, then this is 
reflected in an improved switching-related success. Still, when looking at the economic 
and technical success, the disengager may realise that, all in all, he is worse off 
compared to the status predominating before. (Cf. id., p.192) 
 
To summarise, the following figure “shows how the different success dimensions and 
the ex ante expectations merge into the evaluation of the supplier-switching success” 
(Id., p.193): 
 
28 
 
Figure 3: Evaluation of the supplier switching success 
Source: Kirst, 2008, p.193 
 
3.4 Systematic switching 
 
Finally, it has to be clarified in what way a systematic structured switch can increase 
the buyer’s competitiveness. As already mentioned, supplier switches take place due to 
supplier weaknesses causing a poor performance on the part of the supplying 
company, resulting in a decreasing performance of the disengager and thus in 
weakened competitiveness. This situation needs to be improved by pursuing the exit or 
voice strategy. Corresponding to the subject matter of the present work, the 
assumption that, ultimately, the buyer decides in favour of the former is made here. 
Depending on the kind of weakness, the objective of the buying company is to achieve 
a level of competitiveness accomplished prior to the occurrence of the weakness or to 
surpass the level accomplished before the switch. Until the achievement of the 
intended objective, the disengager has to accept his rather weak competitive position. 
Here, the systematic structured switch comes into play in order to prevent this state 
persist longer than it has to. A systematic performance of the different phases’ activities 
described in this chapter enables companies to reach the goals related to switching in 
a faster and more efficient way. Consequently, a competitive advantage can be 
achieved. Furthermore, the systematisation of activities related to a supplier 
replacement permits the planning and structuring of a switch in advance and the 
organising of the associated “tasks along different phases and activities. The 
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developed structure of supplier-switching activities enables disengagers to identify 
time- and resource-saving potentials by, for example, parallelizing or pulling forward 
certain switching activities, in a more systematic manner.” (Id., p.201) To reduce the 
time required and to increase efficiency are the main advantages of systematisation put 
into effect before the need of changing the supplying company arises. Accordingly, a 
competitive advantage can be gained by using a systematic switching structure. (Cf. 
id., pp.199-201) 
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4 The facilitation and improvement of 
supplier switching decisions 
 
“Exploiting the potential of alternative supply sources and the problem of when and 
how to switch to an alternative supplier are fundamental issues every firm has to cope 
with.” (Wagner et al., 2007, p.701) The present chapter will therefore try to describe, 
examine and compare different models designed to support companies in their 
decision-making process preceding a potential supplier switch. 
 
4.1 Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) 
 
At first, the paper ‘Managing supplier switching’ by Joel S. Demski, David E. M. 
Sappington and Pablo T. Spiller will be presented and analysed. The authors examine 
and compare entry and auditing as instruments to verify the cost report of an 
incumbent supplier, the former under the conditions of shared cost information (first-
best) and both under the conditions of not-shared cost information. Their intention is to 
identify when and how it is optimal to invite another supplier to enter. 
The mathematical terms used when describing the model are taken from the paper of 
Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987). Furthermore, it has to be referred to the 
original paper concerning detailed calculations and corresponding proofs. 
 
4.1.1 Initial situation 
 
A purchaser whose constituents are consumers has to procure a product for them 
whereas their demand is common knowledge. There is an incumbent supplier I  and a 
potential second supplier E . Both have private information regarding their production 
costs. These costs are correlated and, therefore, the new supplier can be considered 
as a monitor of the other supplier’s costs. The resulting advantages of this constellation 
are that the exaggeration of costs by the incumbent can be limited and hence also his 
rents and that production can be placed to the source with lower costs. 
At the beginning, the purchaser makes decisions regarding the entry of the new 
supplier, a shutdown of one or both sources, the payment to the suppliers and their 
produced output depending on the suppliers’ projected costs. Comparing expected 
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benefits with expected costs is the base of all decisions made. The costs and benefits 
are endogenous and depend on the prices determined by the purchaser. These prices 
on their part are dependent on the suppliers’ cost structures and the correlation of their 
costs. (Cf. Demski et al., 1987, pp.77-79) 
 
4.1.2 Model 
 
The cost function of supplier },{ EIi ∈  is composed of the sum of the fixed costs iF  
and the marginal production costs ic  times the quantity of output delivered iQ , i.e.: 
iii QcF + . 
The fixed costs are commonly known. The level of marginal production cost is private 
information inherent to the relevant supplier, but only after being prepared to produce. 
The marginal cost can be low or high and are represented by ic1  respectively ic2  with 
ii cc 21 < . The fixed costs can be divided into a recoverable ( ii Fs )1( − ) and a non-
recoverable fraction ( ii Fs ) whereas is  denotes the sunk costs. (Cf. id., p.79f.) 
 
The following assumptions have been made: 
1. “The incumbent has a marginal cost advantage: 
EIEI cccc 2211 <<< .” (Id., p.80) 
2. The marginal cost of the suppliers are positively correlated. This means, if the 
incumbent’s costs are low, it is more likely that the entrant’s costs are low as 
well. 
3. The goods produced by the two suppliers are identical. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
The sequence in the decision process is as follows: The purchaser asks for a 
projection of the cost structure, at first from the incumbent and later, if entry is called 
upon, from the entrant. This can be done by both after incurring their fixed and having 
an overview over their marginal costs. Based on the primarily occurring projection of 
the incumbent’s marginal cost, the purchaser possesses several decision opportunities: 
He can authorise production by the established supplier, initiate his shutdown or call 
upon the second supplier. In case of the latter, the purchaser decides whether both, 
one or none will be the prospective producers after the entrant’s cost report. 
The purchaser determines the compensation of the suppliers and their production 
quotas which “are administered with a price and subsidy scheme” (Ibid.). The subsidies 
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illustrate the quantity-independent, the price the quantity-dependent part of the 
compensation. Since demand is commonly known, the price dictates the total 
production level. The profit of a supplier is composed of the sum of price times quantity, 
thus revenue, and subsidy less the costs of production. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
In case of no entry, the price Ijp  depends solely on the marginal costs { }IIIj ccc 21 ,∈  
reported by the incumbent. The further variables are also used in conjunction with this 
scenario: The production quota is represented by )( IjpQ . The incumbent’s assigned 
subsidy is indicated by IjT−  or, to simplify the interpretation, 
I
jT  denotes the tax 
imposed on him. Since there is also the possibility of a shutdown of the established 
supplier, j
I
r  indicates the probability of him being the producer and j
I
j rr −≡ 1
0
 of him 
being not. The tax corresponding to the latter is denoted as IjT
0
. 
The notation in case of entry is as follows: The probability of an entering invitation of 
the entrant is represented by je . The superscript { }0,,, IEEIl ∈  will be used as 
sourcing index to symbolise which supplier produces. The probability of using source l  
after entry and reported costs of Ijc  and { }EEEk ccc 21 ,∈  is indicated by jkl r . 
Correspondingly, the price is denoted by jk
l p , the quantity by )( jkl pQ  and the tax 
imposed on the incumbent by Ijk
lT  and on the entrant by Ejk
lT . Here, a distinction has to 
be drawn between cases where one supplier acts as a sole producer and those where 
both produce just fraction ijkf  of the total quantity )( jkIE pQ . (Cf. id., p.80f.) 
 
The purchaser may utilise five different kinds of policy instruments during the 
procurement process to avoid an exaggeration of costs: shutdown probabilities, entry 
probabilities, prices, taxes and production shares. (Cf. id., p.78, p.81) He is advised to 
choose these instruments in a way that “maximize[s] expected consumers’ surplus, 
CS , net of subsidy payments” (Id., p.81). Thereby, minimum expected profits of iΠ  
have to be guaranteed to the suppliers and penalties in case of an exit (which is 
possible at any time) are limited to the sunk portion of their initial investments, ii Fs . 
(Cf. id., p.82) 
 
In the following, supplemental notation linked with profit calculations of the suppliers 
will be introduced: 
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The first calculation shows the profit of the incumbent in case of his shutdown when he 
reports Ijc  although his true costs are 
I
mc . This illustrates that the supplier cannot 
recover the sunk fraction of his investment in such a situation. 
I
j
III
m
I
j TFsc
00 )( −−≡Π
 
The second calculation represents the incumbent supplier’s profit in case of no entry 
when he is allowed to produce and reports Ijc  instead of the true costs 
I
mc . 
I
j
II
j
II
mj
II
m
I
j
I TFpQcpc −−−≡Π )(][)(  
The third calculation reflects the profit of supplier i  in case of his shutdown after entry 
and reported costs of Ijc  and 
E
kc . 
i
jk
liii
m
i
jk
l TFsc −−≡Π )(
 for innl ≠= ,,0  
The fourth calculation illustrates the profit of supplier i  when being chosen as the sole 
producer ( il = ) after cost reports amounting to Ijc  and Ekc . 
i
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The fifth calculation shows the event of production by both suppliers after projected 
cost of Ijc  and 
E
kc . 
i
jk
IEi
jk
IEi
mjk
IEi
jk
i
m
i
jk
IE TFpQcpfc −−−≡Π )(][)(
 (Cf. ibid.) 
 
Additionally, further assumptions have to be noted: 
4. “The net increase in surplus from continuing operations when price is set equal 
to marginal cost is positive, even when high costs are realized: 
.,,0]1[)( 2 EIiFscCS iii =>−−  
5. […] Net surpluses are ranked in a manner consistent with realized production 
costs: 
[ ] [ ] EEEIII FscCSFscCS −−>−− 1)(1)( 11  
[ ] [ ] EEEIII FscCSFscCS −−>−−> 1)(1)( 22 .” (Id., p.83) 
 
Now, “the purchaser’s problem is to maximize expected consumers’ surplus net of 
subsidy payments” (Ibid.): 
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The problem is subject to the following constraints: 
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 The incumbent’s individual rationality constraint ensures that he receives at 
least his reservation profit. 
 
 
[ ]
[ ] 2,1,)(1)(
)(1)(
,
2
1 21
,0
2
1 21
=Π−+








Π
+
≥
Π−+








Π
+
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑
==
==
mjcrecre
crecre
Iol
I
j
I
m
l
m
l
m
k l
I
j
I
mk
l
mk
l
jj
jk
m
Il
I
j
I
j
l
j
l
j
k l
I
j
I
jk
l
jk
l
jj
jk
j
φφ
φ
φφ
φ
   (3) 
 The incumbent’s self-selection constraint assures that in case of Ij
I cc =  he can 
gain the maximum expected profit by a true report of Ic . 
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The entrant’s individual rationality constraint should guarantee him the receipt of 
at least EΠ  in case of entry and a report of Ijc . 
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 The self-selection constraint for the entrant should ensure truthful reporting on 
his part after reported costs of Ijc  and realised costs of 
E
kc . 
 
 2,1,,0)( ==−≥Π mjIlFsc IIImIjl            (6) 
The incumbent’s bankruptcy constraint is used in case of no entry taking place 
to make sure that his profit will not go below the amount he was to receive if he 
would leave. 
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{ } { } IEEIlEIimkjFsece iijimijklj ,,,0,2,1,,)( ===∀−≥Π       (7) 
This bankruptcy constraint refers to the situation of entry. It serves the same 
purpose the above mentioned does, but with respect to supplier i . (Cf. id., 
p.83f.) 
 
Before showing the properties of the purchaser’s problem in the next chapter, two 
benchmark solutions - the first-best and the auditing problem - will be presented in 
order to help establish a better understanding of how to optimise procurement. (Cf. id., 
p.84) 
 
4.1.3 The benchmark solutions: First-best and auditing 
problem 
 
The first-best problem addresses the case where the purchaser is aware of the cost 
information of both suppliers. The auditing problem illustrates when an imperfect and 
costly monitor of the established supplier’s costs is available. The difference to the first-
best problem lies in the absence of an alternative production source. Generally, both 
are given by the purchaser’s problem mentioned above. But whereas the self-selection 
constraints, (3) and (5), are excluded in the former case, the following restriction is 
added in the latter: 
 .2,1,0 =∀== kjrr jkIEjkE  
Connecting both problems leads to a natural benchmark. Namely, the cost of an audit 
is as high as the direct costs of entry being composed of the sunk costs plus the 
reservation profit of the second supplier ( EEE Fs Π+ ). The purchaser’s decision then 
is based on a comparison of these costs with the benefits expected when an audit is 
carried out or entry is invited. The benefit in the first-best case refers to an increased 
consumer surplus due to a possible low-cost source. In the auditing case, it refers to 
the value of supplemental cost information of the incumbent. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
The properties of both benchmark solutions will be shown and examined more closely 
in the following subchapters. 
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4.1.3.1 Solution to the first-best problem 
 
In order to be able to discuss the solution to the first-best problem in greater detail, the 
net consumers’ surplus 
ii
jk
i
jk
i FspCSpNCS ]1[)()( −−=  
has to be introduced as the relevant decision variable. Its suitability can be illustrated 
by the fact that it contains the portion of fixed costs which is recoverable in case of a 
shutdown. Furthermore, it is important for determining the point in time at which an 
invitation of entry and a shutdown have to take place. (Cf. id., p.84f.) 
 
“Lemma 1. The solution to the first-best problem has the following properties: 
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 otherwise0= .“ (Id., p.85) 
 
As shown in Lemma 1, if information is shared by the purchaser, entry may take place 
or not. The new supplier will be invited if the expected net surplus in case of entry 
exceeds the one to be expected without entry by an amount that is higher than the 
direct costs of entry. The price then equals the marginal cost of the supplier with the 
largest NCS . In such a situation the suppliers will not gain rents and will not produce 
at the same time due to economies of scale. 
The above said can be intensified in reference to the assumptions made. Under 
Assumption 4, a strictly positive NCS  can be presumed when price equals marginal 
cost. Therefore, the purchaser always decides in favour of production. With regard to 
Assumption 1, entry only takes place in case of a high-cost report by the incumbent as 
the entrant is the more efficient supplier just then. “Moreover, with net consumers’ 
surplus and marginal cost perfectly (negatively) aligned under Assumption 5” (Ibid.), 
the lowest-marginal-cost supplier is the selected producer at any time. (Cf. ibid.) 
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4.1.3.2 Solution to the auditing problem 
 
Generally, the difference between the above described first-best and the auditing 
problem is that the purchaser cannot observe the costs of the suppliers. The 
incumbent’s costs can be monitored for a constant expense of EEE Fs Π+  with the 
help of an audit. In this case, the buyer has to take the production costs as well as the 
control costs that induce truthful reporting into consideration. 
The following subchapters cover several main issues associated with the auditing 
problem in greater detail. The therein used variables with hats symbolise the solution to 
the problem. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
4.1.3.2.1 No role for auditing 
 
At first, the situation in which auditing independently of its costs does not play a 
beneficial role will be considered. This is the case “when the bankruptcy bound, 
II Fs− , is sufficiently low that the incumbent’s rents can be eliminated without 
productive distortions and without the threat of an audit” (Ibid.). To avoid cost 
exaggeration by the supplier after a high-cost report (critical incentive problem), a 
setting of his profit at a lower level is necessary, i.e. 
[ ] .ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)(ˆ 222222 IIIIIIIII FsTFpQcpc −=−−−≡Π  
A sufficient rise in profit that initiates true cost reports by a supplier with low costs 
would then be 
 
[ ] ).ˆ()(ˆ)(ˆ 2122212 IIIIIII pQcccc −=Π−Π  
When this rise “is sufficiently small relative to IΠ  even with efficient pricing (i.e., 
II cp 22ˆ = ), then the purchaser can hold the incumbent to his reservation level of 
expected profit and maximize total expected surplus” (Id., p.86). The meaning of 
‘sufficiently small’ is that the inequality 
 
[ ][ ] IIIIII cQccFs Π≤−++− )( 2121211 φφ      (8) 
holds. If so, an audit is not required as the purchaser can guide the supplier by 
rewarding him generously in case of Ic1  and rather meagrely ( II Fs− ) in case of Ic2 . 
The above said will be formally shown in Lemma 2: (Cf. id., p.85f.) 
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“Lemma 2. If inequality (8) and Assumptions 1-4 hold, the solution to the auditing 
problem will have 
 ,1ˆ,0ˆ == j
I
j re   and  .2,1ˆ =∀= jcp IjjI “ (Id., p.86) 
 
This reinforces the fact that the problem of cost exaggeration is less binding in the 
event of large sunk costs. Additionally, the situation of the purchaser is facilitated if 
there is just a small cost advantage for an established supplier with low costs and if low 
costs are rather improbable for him. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
4.1.3.2.2 Nontrivial role for auditing 
 
In the following, the case where auditing plays a nontrivial role will be examined. The 
therewith related insights can be found in Proposition 1. Below used 0ˆ ≥λ  stands for 
the Lagrange multiplier linked to the individual rationality constraint. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
“Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold. If inequality (8) is not satisfied, the 
solution to the auditing problem has the following properties: 
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(vii) )1,0[ˆ ∈Iλ .” (Id., p.86f.) 
 
One of the most important objectives of the purchaser is to avoid cost exaggeration 
with the help of the instruments available to him. It is therefore optimal to offer an 
incumbent with low costs the amount of rents he was to gain in case of a high-cost 
report (property (iv)). This can be achieved by the use of price distortions, shutdown 
probabilities and auditing as described below. 
At first, price distortions will be examined. Properties (i) and (v) go into the same 
direction. The former reports that price (and quantity) distortions only take place in case 
of high costs. The latter informs that true reporting of high costs leads to a minimal 
profit. Under the assumption that a high-cost supplier will neither be shut down nor 
audited, the profit of a low-cost one is as high as the amount that was to be gained with 
a high-cost report, 
[ ] )ˆ( 212 pQccFs IIIII −+− . 
A rise of 2pˆ
I
 results in a reduction of quantity )ˆ( 2pQ I  and consequently of the related 
rents to which the price distortion can be traced back. Anyway, no price distortion 
occurs after a low-cost report. This can be deduced from the fact that a supplier with 
high costs has no incentive to understate costs. It is therefore not beneficial to distort 
)ˆ( 1pQ I . 
Next, shutdown probabilities will be contemplated. That it is not in the buyer’s interest 
to shut down a supplier with low costs is noted by property (ii). It also reports, analogue 
to property (iii), that a shutdown of a high-cost one is possible. Accordingly, the risk a 
low-cost supplier takes by reporting high costs is a possible shutdown and therewith 
related a minimum level of profit. “As with the price distortions, a commitment to reduce 
consumers’ surplus limits the information rents of the low cost supplier.” (Id., p.87) Like 
in the first-best case, a shutdown only takes place if the NCS  is continuously negative. 
Here, endogenous prices can be found. 
Lastly, auditing will be considered. As mentioned above, there is no need to prevent a 
supplier with high costs from the exaggeration of his costs. This leads to the conclusion 
that a low-cost reporting firm must not be audited. An audit will be carried out after 
projection of high costs if the increase in NCS  is greater than the auditing costs 
(property (iv)). “The audit report is used to structure a lottery on prices (and therefore 
quantities) for the supplier. These prices determine the expected increase in net 
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consumers’ surplus that results from an audit.” (Ibid.) The intention of this lottery is to 
lower the incentive of an incumbent with low costs to exaggerate his costs. Regarding 
this matter, a small expected output after reported costs of Ic2  leads to a smaller 
incremental profit as well. Furthermore, the costs of the incumbent and the signal 
provided by an audit are positively correlated as it is the case with the suppliers’ cost 
structures. Hence, the incentive of a low-cost supplier to report falsely is diminished 
due to a high price set and the therewith linked low quantity in response to an audit 
signalling low costs. The resulting implication on total expected surplus can be 
compensated by a reduction of the price established after the verification of a high-cost 
report of the incumbent through the audit. 
The prices set after an audit ( 21pˆI  and 22pˆI ) are chosen in a way that the expected 
consumers’ surplus is equivalent to the one to be expected in case of a price set after a 
report of Ic2  and no audit. (Cf. id., p.87f.) 
In summary, price, shutdown and audit are used in order to restrict the supplier’s rents 
which arise out of his information advantage. These desired restrictions can be induced 
by quantity distortions which again are caused by price distortions or shutdown 
decisions. (Cf. id., p.88) “The quantity distortions may be informed by an outside audit, 
depending upon a comparison of the costs of this audit and its expected benefits in 
controlling the information rents of the incumbent producer.” (Ibid.) 
 
4.1.4 The optimal procurement policy in case of private 
information and the possibility of an entry 
 
In this chapter, the change of the optimal procurement policy will be contemplated 
when the identified suppliers have private information and an entry is possible. At first, 
the corresponding proposition will be shown and is followed by its interpretation. (Cf. 
ibid.) 
 
“Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold and that inequality (8) is not 
satisfied. Then the solution to (1)-(7) has the following properties: 
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There are several parallels between the solutions to the auditing and the purchaser’s 
problem (1)-(7). As already noted, only in case of stated high costs price distortions 
take place. Since a report of low costs is the most beneficial setting, a second supplier 
will not be invited to enter in this situation. The decisions regarding entry and shutdown 
are dependent on the identical net consumers’ surplus calculus. In case of no entry, the 
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incumbent will be shut down if the NCS  is negative. In contrast, the supplier with the 
highest NCS  will be chosen in case of entry. Hence, if the costs reported by the 
entrant are lower than those reported by the incumbent, the former becomes the sole 
supplier. “Entry will occur only when the net consumers’ surplus that is expected to 
result exceeds the amount that is ensured absent entry by an amount in excess of the 
costs of entry 
[ ] ( ){ }22212 / φφλ +Π+ EEEE Fs . 
Of course, what makes these observations nontrivial is the fact that the prices that 
determine the magnitude of net consumers’ surpluses are again endogenous.” (Id., 
p.89) But, as will be shown in the following, these prices vary from those constituted in 
the auditing problem. (Cf. ibid.) 
The mix of policy instruments chosen by the purchaser differs depending on whether 
entry or audit is used to verify the cost projection. Unlike auditing, a second supplier 
provides information but is also a possible source. Therefore, entry is more 
advantageous for two reasons: 1. A shutdown of the incumbent must not result in an 
output of zero. 2. There is another supplying source with potentially lower costs. 
Accordingly, the following corollary can be drawn: If the accomplishment of an audit is 
optimal with a strict positive probability ( 0ˆ2 >e ), also a decision in favour of entry takes 
place with positive probability ( 02 >e ). In contrast, in case of always deciding against 
entry ( 02 =e ), auditing will not be taken into consideration either ( 0ˆ2 =e ). Based on 
this, one may deduce that entry is able to imitate an audit. It has to be mentioned that 
moral hazard is no problem in the alternative supplier’s sphere if he is used as a 
monitor only. Then, the costs of both verifying means correspond to each other. From 
this it follows that using auditing nontrivially implies the efficiency of entry. (Cf. id., 
p.89f.) 
Additionally, it has to be mentioned that under certain conditions, i.e. 
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an alternative supplier would indeed be invited to enter with positive probability ( 12 =e ) 
but the same does not apply for an audit ( 0ˆ2 =e ). This can again be attributed to the 
additional benefit of an alternative source. Even though the elimination of the 
established supplier’s rents is possible without productive distortions and auditing, 
entry plays a crucial role concerning an expected gain resulting from lower costs. “Note 
that it is more likely that the purchaser will invite entry with strictly positive probability 
while the optimal probability of auditing is zero, the less highly correlated are Ic  and 
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Ec , ceteris paribus.” (Id., p.90) In case of little correlation, the insight gained into the 
course of an audit is just a weak indicator of the established supplier’s costs. Moreover, 
the attractiveness of the supplier lottery is greater due to limited correlation as the 
chance of a low-cost report ( Ec1 ) on the part of the entrant is higher in case of entry 
( II cc 2= ). (Cf. ibid.) 
Heading in the same direction, it is easily possible to show that the decision in favour of 
an additional supplier happens with higher probability than of an audit, “even when 
0ˆ2 >e  in the solution to the auditing problem” (Ibid.). In this case, entry is the stronger 
instrument and is applied leastwise as much as auditing. On the other hand, also the 
contrary is feasible. Under certain settings the optimum would be to use entry with a 
lower probability. Intuitionally, the reason therefore is that entry can guide the 
established supplier in the desired direction more effectively. Consequently, the more 
powerful policy instrument of entry can be used with lower probability but still results in 
the favoured discipline. Accordingly, to gain complete understanding of the purchaser’s 
permission of entry, the mix of instruments available has to be analysed. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
In the following, “a setting in which the optimal auditing probability exceeds the optimal 
entry” (Ibid.) one ( 22ˆ ee > ) will be illustrated by introducing a numerical example. Its 
basis is formed by the following assumptions: 
 
“probability structure:  4.2211 == φφ ;  1.2112 == φφ ; 
 cost structure:   5.== IE ss ;  100== IE FF ; 
     202 =
Ic ;  5.202 =Ec ; 
     51 =Ic ;  151 =Ec ; 
 demand structure:  ppQ −= 100)( ; 
 reservation profits:  200=Π=Π IE .” (Id., p.91) 
 
The higher probability of using an audit can be explained by the example’s three 
subsequent features: 
1. The correlation between Ec  and Ic  is high: The difference of  
21122211 φφφφ −  
is relatively large. Consequently, the monitoring of the actual costs of the 
incumbent via the second supplier’s costs is quite precise. Hence, an audit is a 
proper instrument to limit the established supplier’s rents. 
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2. To control the rents of the incumbent is harder compared with those of the 
entering supplier. This results from the fact that the differential between the 
former’s high and low production costs is greater than that of the latter: 
 
EEII cccc 1212 5.515 −=>=− . 
The result in the event of an optimal entry policy if both supplying companies 
are high-cost providers is as follows: The price set in case of production on the 
part of the incumbent exceeds the marginal cost to a greater extent than if the 
entrant was the chosen producer: 
 
EEII cpcp 222222 −>− . 
3. In case of realised high costs, a small cost disadvantage on the part of the 
entrant can be observed: 
5.022 =− EI cc . (Cf. Ibid.) 
A combination of the last two features guarantees that, after inviting a supplier to enter, 
the optimal price if the new provider produces is lower than the corresponding price 
would be if the old one was to produce. Thus, due to the fact that the fixed and sunk 
costs of both are equal, the highest NCS  can be gained if the entrant is the chosen 
producer without exception. This is valid even if he has higher costs. 
Here, entry is a powerful instrument to deter the established supplier from the 
exaggeration of his costs. A shutdown of the incumbent always takes place in case of 
entry. Accordingly, if the invitation to enter would always be the logical consequence of 
reported costs of Ic2 , “the incumbent could be held to a net payoff of 
II Fs− , 
regardless of his cost. To restore the requisite profit level ( IΠ ) to the incumbent and to 
conserve on entry costs ( EEE Fs Π+ )” (Ibid.), the use of entry is restrained by the 
buyer. It is invited with lower probability than an audit with the same costs and 
information content. (Cf. ibid.) 
Next, the above made statement that the entrant is rather chosen as sole producer  
- despite the fact that he has higher costs ( 02 >e  and 122 =rE ) - will be examined. In 
this situation, the decision in favour of an entering high-cost producer is advantageous. 
This results from the fact that the additional, in the present case rather low, production 
costs are easily compensated by the gains resulting from having influence on cost 
exaggeration. This influence can be attributed to the risk of a shutdown the established 
supplier may face after a false report of Ic2 . A reduction of his rents is the resultant 
consequence. In other words, both the direct production and the control costs affect the 
supplier choice. Therefore, the supplier with the lowest direct costs will not be selected 
since he falls behind as soon as control costs are taken into account as well. 
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Consequently, efficient procurement does not exclude high-cost sourcing. Again, this 
highlights that the mix of policy instruments as a whole is essential for the 
understanding of using supplier switching in an optimal way. (Cf. id., p.91f.) 
 
4.1.4.1 Different price levels in case of entry and auditing 
 
The proximate step after analysing the factors determining the intensities of the 
instruments entry and auditing has to be the examination of other policy instruments 
available to the buyer including their optimal configuration. Particularly, the different 
price levels in case of entry and auditing will be considered. The first comparison in this 
vein can be found in Corollary A as quoted below. (Cf. id., p.92) 
 
“Corollary […] [A]. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold, that inequality (8) is not 
satisfied, and that the incumbent is shut down only when the entrant reports low cost: 
12221 == rr
IE
 in the solution to (1)-(7). Then the expected postentry price in the solution 
to (1)-(7) is strictly less than the price announced when entry is not permitted: 
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The advantageous side effect of entry, an entrant being a potential low-cost source, is 
reflected in here. The purchaser can determine a lower price due to the low-cost 
supplier’s cost advantage but this is not valid in general. Under certain conditions, there 
is a possibility of identical prices assigned to an established supplier with high costs in 
the entry and auditing regime or higher prices in the former regime. This can be traced 
back to the dual role of prices as a key to profit and to truly reported costs. 
“Recall that prices may be raised above marginal cost to reduce the associated 
production levels, and (with accompanying subsidy reductions) thereby limit the rents 
to the supplier. On the basis of only a comparison of the lower total surplus versus the 
better incentives for truthful cost projections that price increases provide, however, 
prices may be raised to such an extent that the supplier’s rents are reduced below the 
level necessary to attract him into the industry.” (Ibid.) In this instance, the optimal way 
of restoring rents is a reduction of prices in order to raise the output and not just a rise 
of subsidies. This reduction towards marginal cost leads to an augmentation of total 
surplus that is greater than the supplier’s increasing rents. 
“Analytically, whether prices must be lowered toward marginal cost from their optimal 
levels solely on the basis of considerations of eliciting truthful cost projections depends 
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upon whether the individual rationality constraints bind in the solution to the 
purchaser’s problem.” (Ibid.) In the situation of binding constraints, the further role of 
prices as rent providers becomes apparent. Higher prices can be found under the entry 
respectively auditing regime. This is reported by Corollary C respectively D. In contrast, 
Corollary B shows the event when they neither bind in the solution to the auditing nor to 
the purchaser’s problem. In this case, there are identical prices in both regimes. The 
purpose of Lemma 3 and 4 is to accurately define the binding of the individual 
rationality constraints (in a way that the further role of prices is nontrivial). (Cf. id., 
p.92f.) 
 
“Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold, that inequality (8) is not satisfied, and 
that inequality (9), 
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is satisfied when prices, entry probabilities, and shutdown probabilities are recorded as 
in Proposition 2 with 0=Iλ  and 22212 φφλ +=E . Then 0=Iλ  at the solution to (1)-(7).” 
(Id., p.93) 
 
Looking at inequality (9) in Lemma 3, its left-hand side can be identified as the 
minimum level of expected profit offered to the incumbent in the solution to the 
purchaser’s problem. This level is induced in case of incumbent’s cost of Ic2  by a profit 
amounting to II Fs− . In case of Ic1  it originates from an indifference on the part of the 
incumbent regarding reporting truthfully or falsely ( II cc 2= ). Obviously, the individual 
rationality constraint is not binding if the incumbent’s reservation level is exceeded by 
his minimum expected profit. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
Lemma 4 sets out the corresponding condition in case of an audit. Here, the difference 
is that expected extra rents potentially accrue to the established supplier. This can be 
traced back to the fact that a shutdown must not necessarily take place when EE cc 1=  
is reported. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
“Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold, that inequality (8) does not hold, and 
that inequality (10), 
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is satisfied when prices, entry probabilities, and shutdown probabilities are as recorded 
in Proposition 1 with 0ˆ =Iλ . Then 0ˆ =Iλ  at the solution to the auditing problem. 
 
These lemmas lead immediately to Corollary […] [B]. 
 
Corollary […] [B]. When the conditions of Lemmas 3 and 4 hold, prices play no 
meaningful role in delivering profit to the suppliers, and we have: 
 (i) 22 pˆp II = ; 11 pˆp II = ; 2222 pˆp II = ; 2121 pˆp IE < ; 
 (ii) 22 rˆr II = ; 11 rˆr II = ; 2222 rˆr II ≤ ; 2121 rˆr II ≤ ; 
 (iii) 210220 rˆr ≤ ; and 
 (iv) 22 eˆe ≥ .” (Ibid.) 
 
To recapitulate, if it is not necessary to reduce the prices of the established supplier 
towards marginal cost to accord a higher profit, there are identical prices (and therewith 
also quantities) in the solutions to both problems. In this case, the same shutdown 
probability can be found in the absence of audit and entry across regimes. Because of 
the feature of entry to be a potential low-cost source, the probability of being chosen is 
higher compared to an audit. The following can be attributed to the same feature: After 
knowing the cost report of the established supplier, leastwise one of the suppliers being 
allowed to produce is (slightly) more likely in the entry regime. But it is less probable 
that the incumbent is the producer. As a limitation of the incumbent’s rents is more 
effective in case of entry, more profit has to be assigned to him in case of auditing. 
“Consequently, there will be ranges of parameter values for which inequality (10) holds, 
but inequality (9) does not, and thus lower prices will be realized in the entry regime.” 
(Ibid.) This is increasingly possible 
• when the correlation between Ic  and Ec  is low and therefore auditing is just a 
very limited information provider and 
• when there is a slight cost disadvantage on the part of the entrant and hence 
the additional supplier’s productive role is of great importance. 
Then, if production will be carried out by the incumbent, lower prices can be found in 
the entry regime (compared to the auditing regime) and it is, accordingly, less probable 
that he will be shut down. (Cf. id., p.93f.) 
 
“Corollary […] [C]. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold, that inequality (10) holds, and 
that inequality (9) does not hold. Then 
(i) 22 pˆp II < ; 2222 pˆp II < ; and 
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(ii) 22 rˆr II ≤ ; 2222 rˆr II ≤ .” (Id., p.94) 
 
It has to be considered that the situation of lower prices on the part of the incumbent in 
case of entry is not just restricted to the class of examples of Corollary C. Its shown 
pricing patterns also arise under the numerical example stated before although the 
individual rationality constraints are binding in the solutions to both problems. (Cf. ibid.) 
Furthermore, it shows “that the pattern of relative prices across regimes” (Ibid.) must 
not conform to those in Corollary C. In particular, there is even the possibility that a rise 
of prices would be optimal in case of entry. Corollary D responds to this with regard to 
the conditions of a further numerical example: (Cf. ibid.) 
 
“probability structure: 25.11 =φ ; 40.12 =φ ; 05.21 =φ ; 30.22 =φ ; 
 cost structure:  5.== IE ss ;  30=IF ; 22=EF ; 
    302 =
Ic ;  652 =Ec ; 
    51 =Ic ;  151 =Ec ; 
 demand structure: 3000,500,2)( ppQ = ; 
 reservation profits: 80=Π I ; 50=Π E . 
 
Corollary […] [D]. Under the conditions of [the second numerical] example, the price 
offered to the incumbent after a verification of his high cost projection will be higher 
under the entry regime than under the auditing regime: 
 2222 pˆp
II > .” (Ibid.) 
 
Under the features of the second numerical example the elastic demand curve has to 
be highlighted as being the most important one. Here, in case of entry, the entrant will 
be chosen as the producer if he has low costs ( Ec1 ). If he has high costs, the incumbent 
remains as supplier. Despite the threat of being shut down in the entry regime in case 
of Ec1 , the rents the incumbent can expect are greater in comparison to the auditing 
regime. This is valid for the solution when the prices’ role as profit provider will be 
disregarded ( 0ˆ == II λλ ). (Cf. ibid.) “The extra rents under entry arise because 
 
( )[ ] )ˆ()( 212112212 pQpQ II >+ φφφ , 
largely owing to the presumed elasticity of demand. Thus, with IΠ  established to leave 
the incumbent with zero rents in the entry regime, prices must be lowered in the 
auditing regime to restore the requisite rents to the supplier.” (Ibid.) 
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All in all, it can be stated that innumerable patterns of relative prices are conceivable. 
This can be traced back to the fact that prices take on distinct roles and represent one 
of the policy instruments available to the purchaser only. The optimal application of 
every single instrument depends on the ideal configuration of all others. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
4.2 Wagner and Friedl (2007) 
 
In their paper ‘Supplier switching decisions’ Stephan M. Wagner and Gunther Friedl 
developed a model “to support firms in making the best possible supplier switching and 
sourcing strategy decision for a product they demand. [...] [Its primary intention is] to 
gain more knowledge about supplier switching decisions in the presence of information 
asymmetry, switching costs, competitive reactions, and economies of scale.” (Wagner 
et al., 2007, p.702) 
Their model will be described and examined more closely in the following. The 
mathematical terms used when describing the model are taken from the paper of 
Wagner and Friedl (2007). Again, it will be referred to the original paper regarding 
detailed calculations and corresponding proofs. 
 
4.2.1 Model 
 
Present matter is a one-period model in which the initial situation is an intended 
purchase of quantity x  of a good by buyer B . There is an incumbent supplier 1S  
being able to supply the right quantity for a per-unit price of p . 
If the buyer decides in favour of switching, he can choose between two alternatives, 
namely a partial or a complete switch. The entrant supplier’s ( 2S ) unit cost for the 
product demanded amount to c . 
With the help of decision variable [ ]1,0∈d , the decision to switch is formulated and if: 
• 1=d , a complete switch takes place; 
• d  takes a value between zero and one, a partial switch occurs; 
• 0=d , there is no switching taking place. 
In the former two cases ( 0≠d ), switching costs of s  arising to the buyer are a 
function of the switching decision: (Cf. id., p.702f.) 
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In summary, the following assumptions have been made: 
• The quality of the product required is well-defined. 
• The quantity demanded is predetermined and fixed. 
• The per-unit price is exogenously given, not negotiable and independent of 
quantity. These assumptions will be relaxed afterwards to demonstrate their 
significant effects. 
• The alternative supplier’s unit costs are not precisely known by the buyer. He is 
only informed that it is drawn from a probability distribution with positive values 
in the interval ],[ cc  and 0 outside. The cumulative distribution function is 
denoted as )(cF , the density function as )(cf . “This distribution satisfies a 
usual regularity condition. The inverse hazard rate )()()( cfcFch =  increases 
in c  over its support.” (Id., p.703) 
• The alternative supplier can provide the demanded quality and quantity. (Cf. id., 
p.702f.) 
 
The potential new supplier’s objective is to maximise his profit pi . It is defined as “the 
quantity of money t, he receives from the buyer net of his costs for producing the 
required quantity of the product, i.e. 
cxdt ⋅⋅−=pi “. (Id., p.703) 
 
As the accurate unit costs of 2S  are unknown by the purchaser, a mechanism that 
leads to minimum overall purchasing costs has to be conceived by him. 
Following a first thought, a possibility would be that if the entrant’s price was set in a 
way that the amount of switching plus new purchasing costs was lower than the costs 
in case of delivery by the incumbent, a switch would be carried out. But a potential 
supplier knowing the incumbent’s purchasing and switching costs would select a price 
slightly lower than the one at which the buying company would not switch. Moreover, 
he would just contact the buyer if his unit costs were lower. If this was the case, he 
could gain substantial profit whereas the other party’s benefit would only be marginal. 
Obviously, the above described way is not the most favourable one. By comparison,  
more advantageous would be the configuration of a mechanism that leads to true cost 
reporting by the potential supplier pursuant to the revelation principle. Accordingly, the 
purchaser demands a cost report cˆ  of the entrant and has to make sure that saying the 
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truth is more profitable than lying. This report is the basis for the buyer’s decisions 
regarding switching ( )ˆ(cd ) and the transfer payment ( )ˆ(ct ). The application of this 
mechanism leads to a reduction of the purchasing costs. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
“The buyer’s problem is to choose both the value of the switching variable and the 
payment to 2S  such as to minimize his total purchasing costs according to the 
following program P: 
 
dccfcdspxcdctc
c
ctcd )())](())(1()(min )ˆ(),ˆ( +⋅−+∫  
 
such that 
 (PC) 0)( ≥cpi   c∀ , 
(IC) ),ˆ()( ccc pipi ≥   cc ˆ,∀ , 
(DC) ]1;0[)( ∈cd   c∀ .” (Id., p.704) 
 
“The objective function reflects the expected value of the buyer’s total costs as a sum 
of three components. [These are:] the payment to the entrant supplier, [...] the payment 
to the incumbent supplier according to his volume, and [...] the switching cost. 
The participation constraint (PC) ensures that 2S  receives at least his reservation 
profit of zero. [...] The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) guarantees that 2S  finds it 
optimal to report his costs truthfully. Finally, the decision constraint (DC) restricts the 
set of possible decisions for the buyer to values between 0% and 100%.” (Ibid.) 
 
Additionally, further assumptions have been made: 
• The total quantity the purchaser demands will be normalised, i.e. 1=x . 
• The commitment to any contractual term by the buying party is possible until the 
end of the moves. It is necessary to guarantee a true cost report. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
4.2.2 Analysis 
 
In the following subchapters, the case of observable costs (first-best situation) by the 
buyer will be examined, followed by the case of unobservable costs (second-best 
situation). The corresponding quantities to be switched and transfer payments are 
shown by the respective propositions. 
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4.2.2.1 Benchmark case: Symmetric cost information 
 
The benchmark case is referred to as first-best solution and generally does not mirror 
reality as it assumes the alternative supplier’s costs are known by the buyer. This 
allows him to offer a transfer payment such that an exceeding profit cannot be gained 
by the entrant. The quantity to be switched and the transfer payments will be shown in 
the following proposition. (Cf. id., p.704f.) 
 
“Proposition 1: The first-best quantity to be switched and the optimal transfer payments 
to the entrant supplier are given by 
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where spc −=0 .” (Id., p.704) 
 
Proposition 1 displays the following: 
A complete switch takes place if the costs of the new supplier go below a certain 
threshold 0c  which is made up of the price of the incumbent supplier minus switching 
costs. This means the old supplier-buyer relationship will be terminated. The purchaser 
accepts to bear the entire switching costs since the total of transfer payment and 
switching costs is lower than the amount he was to pay to the incumbent. The payment 
the entrant supplier receives is as high as his costs. 
No switching occurs if the sum of the entrant’s switching and unit costs is higher than 
the amount the buyer was to pay to the incumbent. In this case, a transfer payment 
must not be paid and the second supplier can be entitled as high-cost supplier. (Cf. id., 
p.705) 
 
According to Mayer, Pfeiffer and Schneider (2005), the aforesaid can be illustrated with 
the following diagram. Switching costs are set to zero in order to enable the graphical 
realisation. 
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Figure 4: Costs within the context of the first-best situation 
Modified according to: Mayer et al., 2005, p.503 
 
4.2.2.2 Asymmetric cost information 
 
In case of asymmetric information, it is assumed that the alternative supplier’s costs 
are not observable by the buyer. Here, only the case of true reporting will be examined 
in consideration of the revelation principle. The purchaser’s decisions regarding the 
quantity to be switched and the transfer payment are made for the purpose of 
minimising his total costs and base on the reported costs. At this point, Proposition 2 
has to be presented: (Cf. id., p.705) 
 
“Proposition 2: The optimal quantity to be switched and the optimal transfer payments 
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where *c  is defined by the solution to the equation spchc −=+ )( .” (Ibid.) 
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The dependence of )(* cd  and )(* ct  on the costs reported by the new supplier is 
shown in Proposition 2. This can be obtained by the purchaser by offering a menu of 
two contracts determining these two values as functions of these costs. The menu is 
made up by two different regions: 
In one region, a complete switch will be carried out if the reported costs are lower than 
the threshold. As the true costs have no influence on the delivery quantity, the 
willingness of providers with costs lower than *c  to supply can be assured with the 
help of transfer payments only. As a result, a constant transfer payment will be offered 
independently of the costs. 
In the other region, the existing supplier-buyer relationship remains unchanged (no 
switching) when the reported costs exceed the threshold *c . The sum of switching 
costs and transfer payment would exceed the amount the buyer was to pay to the 
incumbent supplier. Therefore, switching would not be taken into consideration. Hence, 
)(* cd
 and )(* ct  amount to zero. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
According to Mayer, Pfeiffer and Schneider (2005), the following diagram illustrates the 
above said. The corresponding calculations can be found in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 5: Costs within the context of the second-best situation 
Modified according to: Mayer et al., 2005, p.504 
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The next chapter highlights the phenomenon of switching related inertia which be-
comes apparent when looking at and comparing 0c  and *c  from Proposition 1 and 2. 
 
4.2.2.3 Switching inertia 
 
Comparing the definitions of 0c  and *c  shows that cost boundaries (which separate 
the cost regions) are smaller in case of asymmetric information. This means the 
switching decision has been hesitantly made. In other words, there is some inertia in 
this decision. (Cf. id., p.705) This may be illustrated by the following example: “If the 
true unit costs of 2S  are higher than *c , but below 0c , the buyer would not switch to 
the alternative supplier, although it would be advantageous for him from an ex-post 
perspective.” (Ibid.) 
To better understand the aforesaid, the transfer payments have to be examined. An 
information premium paid by the purchaser is used to make sure that the alternative 
supplier reports truthfully. If it was not paid, it would be beneficial to notify higher costs. 
For limiting reasons regarding the premium, the above mentioned boundaries have to 
be lowered. This leads to a reduction of both the information rent and the switching 
probability despite the possibility of a cost-cutting. (Cf. id., p.706) “The optimal cutoff-
level balances this tradeoff, and is defined at the point, where the marginal benefits of 
further lowering the boundaries equal the costs.” (Ibid.) 
As mentioned above, waiting for a price offered by a potential supplier is not optimal. 
Here, a mechanism dealing with this subject matter and leading to a minimisation of the 
purchasing costs despite the payment of an information premium will be presented. (Cf. 
ibid.) 
 
4.2.3 Advanced model: Competition and economies of 
scale 
 
So far, the assumption has been made that the incumbent does not react to a change 
in quantity and to the entry of an alternative supplier with an alteration in price. Now, 
the more realistic situation of a price change caused by an additional supplier’s entry 
and partial switching will be examined. The latter leads to a decrease of quantity 
delivered by 1S  and, consequently, to a loss of economies of scale. To address both 
competition and partial switching, the unit price charged by the established supplier 
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consists of two additive effects, the competitive and the economies-of-scale effect. 
Being a function of quantity, it may be described as follows: 
 )()()( dpdpdp ec += . (Cf. ibid.) 
Denotation )(dpc  captures the competitive effect and is a result of competition 
encouraged by the buyer through the procurement of the quantity needed from multiple 
(in the present case two) suppliers allowing him to profit from lower prices. The 
underlying principle applying is: The larger the quantity switched to the new supplier, 
the lower is the price offered by the established supplier. The price of the competitive 
effect is composed as shown below: 
 
d
dp c
⋅+
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The positive parameter θ  symbolises the price in case no competition takes place. 
Parameter α  represents the importance level of the competitive effect, more precisely 
the price-cutting due to a larger quantity delivered by the new supplier. (Cf. ibid.) 
The economies-of-scale effect, denoted by )(dpe , is a result of reduced unit costs due 
to increased production or distribution size of a company. A reduction of the 
established supplier’s quantity delivered leads to an increase of the unit costs and 
therewith to a revocation of quantity discounts and a rise in prices. The price of the 
economies-of-scale effect is composed as follows: 
 
d
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−
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)( β . 
The positive parameter β  represents the importance level of the economies-of-scale 
effect. (Cf. id., p.706f.) 
 
The following two assumptions concerning the parameter values have been made: 
• The first one, 
β
α
θ
>
+1
, 
should guarantee that in case of small values of d  the competitive effect is the 
stronger of both effects. If not, the results would be the same the basic model 
showed. 
• The second one, 
α
θα
+
⋅
<
1
s , 
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should limit the switching costs upwardly since partial switching is just beneficial 
in case of relatively low switching costs in comparison to the competitive effect. 
(Cf. id., p.707) 
 
Again, the buyer aims to minimise his overall purchasing costs. Now, the problem 
below has to be solved: 
 
 
.)())](())(())(1()(min )ˆ(),ˆ( dccfcdscdpcdct
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The substitution of p  by ))(( cdp  is the only change to the former program. The 
constraints remain the same. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
Primarily, the case of symmetric cost information will be contemplated, followed by that 
of asymmetric cost information. The respective propositions show the corresponding 
quantities to be switched as well as the transfer payments. 
 
4.2.3.1 Benchmark case: Symmetric cost information 
 
At first, the benchmark case will be examined, assuming the existence of observable 
costs. (Cf. ibid.) Additionally, a distinction is made “between 
• a low-cost entrant supplier, where ],[ 01ccc ∈ , 
• an intermediate-cost entrant supplier, where ),( 0201 ccc ∈ , and 
• a high-cost entrant supplier, where ],[ 02 ccc ∈ . 
The following proposition presents the first-best degree of switching and the 
corresponding transfer payments to the entrant supplier.” (Ibid.) 
 
“Proposition 3: The first-best quantity to be switched and the optimal transfer payments 
to the entrant supplier are given by 
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where 
α
θβ
+
+−=
1
0
1c  and )1(2)1(02 αθαααθβ +−+++−= ssc .” (Ibid.) 
 
Proposition 3 shows that the buyer chooses between three alternative strategies 
depending on the entrant supplier’s cost level. 
The buyer decides in favour of a complete switch and, hence, a termination of the old 
supplier-buyer relationship if the new supplier has low costs. The fact that he has to 
bear the whole switching costs does not matter as the resulting amount of transfer 
payment plus switching costs is lower than price times quantity he was to pay to the 
former supplier. The transfer payment obtained by 2S  amounts to his costs. 
A partial switch takes place in case of an entrant with intermediate costs. To partition 
the quantity delivered among the providers is favourable due to a price reduction on the 
part of the incumbent induced by competition. “Therefore, the buyer’s total purchasing 
costs become a convex function of the quantity of products purchased from 2S .” (Id., 
p.708) The quantity to be switched decreases linearly in the costs of the entrant and in 
the parameters α  and β . The amount of the transfer payment results from the costs 
of 2S  times the quantity needed. 
No switching occurs if the entrant’s costs are high. This can be traced back to the fact 
that the established supplier’s price is lower than the total of switching and unit costs of 
the potential supplier. Therefore, transfer payments must not be paid. (Cf. id., p.707f.) 
 
In the following, the impact of changes of the switching cost s  and the parameters α  
and β  on the boundaries 01c  and 02c  between the different cost types of the entrant 
supplier will be analysed. 
A rise of s  has no influence on the boundary between a low- and an intermediate-cost 
supplier. But it has on the boundary between an intermediate- and a high-cost one; 
namely, it leads to a reduction. This means that it would not impact the decision to 
switch completely but the partial-switching region would be diminished, making the 
persistence of the old supplier-buyer relationship more likely. 
A reduction of the boundary between a low- and an intermediate-cost supplier and an 
increase of the boundary between an intermediate- and a high-cost one is to be caused 
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by a rise of α . A stronger competitive effect (symbolised by the increase of α ) makes 
partial switching more beneficial. 
A rise of β  reduces the boundary between a low- and an intermediate-cost supplier as 
well as between an intermediate- and a high-cost one. A higher β  causes an enlarged 
region where the existing supplier-buyer relationship remains unchanged and therefore 
switching is less probable. (Cf. id., p.708) 
 
4.2.3.2 Asymmetric cost information 
 
The assumptions made in this case regarding the entrant supplier’s costs, true 
reporting and the buyer’s decision match those in Chapter 4.2.2.2. Again, a distinction 
is made between low-, intermediate- and high-cost suppliers. At this point, Proposition 
4 has to be presented: 
 
“Proposition 4: The optimal quantity to be switched and the optimal transfer payments 
to the entrant supplier are given by 
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where *1c  is defined by the solution to equation α
θβ
+
+−=+
1
)(chc  and *2c  is defined 
by the solution to equation )1(2)1()( αθαααθβ +−+++−=+ sschc .” (Id., p.708f.) 
 
Proposition 4 shows the dependence of )(* cd  and )(* ct  on the potential supplier’s 
reported costs. This can be obtained by the purchaser by offering a menu of contracts 
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determining these two values as functions of these costs. The mentioned menu 
consists of the three regions described below. 
When the entrant’s costs are below *1c , the different cost types cannot be separated. 
The costs are low and, therefore, a complete switch is beneficial for the buyer. In this 
case, the quantity to be delivered does not depend on the true costs. With the help of 
transfer payments the buyer can only make sure that every supplier with costs smaller 
than *1c  wants to deliver. In general, the transfer payment should be constant and 
independent of the buyer’s costs for this reason. 
Partial switching takes place when the alternative supplier’s costs are above the 
threshold *1c  but below 
*
2c . The quantity delivered by 2S  is the lower the higher his 
costs are. Furthermore, the total transfer payments received by him diminish and the 
unit price rises with his costs. Quantity to be delivered and transfer payments are 
instruments used by the purchaser to guarantee true cost reports. A reduction of both 
instruments with increasing costs prevents from cost exaggeration by the new supplier. 
Although a higher price per unit could be achieved with an overstatement, the entrant 
leaves it undone since it is more advantageous for him. Quantity and price are 
instruments used by the purchaser to restrain the new supplier from reporting falsely. 
The reaction of the buyer to a cost exaggeration on the part of the entrant would be a 
quantity reduction. The gain deriving from a false report will exactly be balanced by the 
loss as a result of this reduction. The utilisation of these instruments allows the 
purchaser to distinguish the different cost types in the intermediate region. 
In case of exceeding the threshold *2c  by the reported costs, the old supplier-buyer 
relationship will be preserved by the buyer (no switching). As prevention serves the fact 
that the sum of switching costs and transfer payment is higher than the amount that 
has to be paid to 1S . Consequently, )(* cd  and )(* ct  amount to zero. (Cf. id., p.709) 
 
At this point, the presence of an intermediate region has to be highlighted. It is optimal 
from the buyer’s view to change his strategy from single to dual sourcing due to a price 
reduction on the part of the incumbent referable to competition. The reason therefore 
can be illustrated by a comparison with the basic model described above. The 
competitive effect is causal for partial switching. If there was no competition, just 
complete or no switching would take place. This leads to the conclusion that dual 
sourcing is the better solution in case of competition between suppliers. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
According to Chapter 4.2.2.3, the advanced model comprises a closer examination of 
switching inertia as well. 
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4.2.3.3 Switching inertia 
 
A comparison of Propositions 3 and 4 illustrates that the particular cost boundaries 
become smaller in case of unobservable costs ( 01*1 cc <  and 02*2 cc < ) due to a positive 
inverse hazard rate for all values of c . Again, inertia is inherent in the decision to 
switch. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
The information premium paid should guarantee true reporting by the new supplier. Its 
value depends on the regions mentioned above. 
• “In the case of high costs, no switching occurs and consequently no information 
premium has to be paid. 
• In the case of intermediate costs, the information premium is determined by the 
integral from the true costs to the boundary of the intermediate and the high 
cost region. 
• In the case of low costs, the information premium is given by the sum of two 
terms. The first is the difference between the true cost and the boundary costs 
to the intermediate level. The second is the integral over the marginal 
information premium that would be obtained in the intermediate region.” (Id., 
p.709f.) 
The disadvantage of paying a premium is that it raises switching costs and, as a result, 
makes switching a less beneficial option for the buyer. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
To complete Chapter 4, a summary of the results obtained and observations made will 
be given in the following. 
 
The model of Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) has been described first. In order 
to identify how and when it is optimal to replace the incumbent supplier, the authors 
examine the structuring of policy instruments available to a purchaser which should 
constrain the cost exaggeration of suppliers. (Cf. Demski et al., 1987, p.77f.) The mix of 
instruments, such as shutdown probabilities, entry probabilities, prices, taxes and 
production shares, changes depending on whether entry or auditing has been used as 
means to verify a cost projection. Not only is entry able to imitate an audit but, in 
addition, provides the advantage of being both information provider and potential 
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source. Therefore, a shutdown of the incumbent must not result in an output of zero 
and another supplying source with potentially lower costs is available. Thus, the 
optimal auditing strategy differs from the optimal entry one. 
For instance, it becomes apparent that a decision in favour of entry can be more 
probable than a decision in favour of auditing. Anyway, the opposite cannot be 
excluded either. Depending on the conditions, the invitation probability of entry will be 
higher when the entrant’s cost disadvantage is small and when the incumbent can 
expect high rents emerging from his information advantage in case of non-use of a 
cost-verifying instrument. 
Furthermore, the model shows that production by the entrant is optimal even in case of 
high costs on his part. This can be traced back to the fact that the supplemental 
production costs are easily compensated by the gains resulting from having influence 
on cost exaggeration. In general terms, both direct production and control costs affect 
the supplier choice. Therefore, the supplier with the lowest direct costs will not be 
selected since he represents a low-cost source only until control costs are taken into 
account. 
In addition, the different price levels in case of entry and auditing were examined. It 
showed that the prices in the entry regime might be higher or lower than in the auditing 
regime, again depending on the conditions. (Cf. id., pp. 89-92) 
Finally, it has to be considered that the optimal application of every single instrument 
depends on the ideal configuration of all others (Cf. id., p.94). This is essential for being 
able to use supplier switching in an optimal way (Cf. id., p.92). 
 
The model of Wagner and Friedl (2007) aims to render assistance to companies in 
case of decision-making with regard to the best possible sourcing strategy and, in 
particular, supplier switching. (Cf. Wagner et al., 2007, p.702) 
At first, the authors examine whether a company decides in favour of entire or partial 
switching in case of symmetric and asymmetric cost information on the part of the 
purchaser. Then, the factors competition and economies of scale are introduced to 
show their impact on the established supplier and the switching decision. Again, an 
examination under symmetric and asymmetric information is carried out. (Cf. id., p.700) 
It shows that an information premium has to be paid by the buyer in order to get a cost 
report from the entrant supplier which corresponds to his true costs. (Cf. id., p.702) The 
appearance of inertia on the part of rational purchasers in the course of a switching 
decision becomes obvious when the suppliers’ costs are unobservable. As a result, the 
full potential of minimising the total purchasing costs cannot be exploited. The 
information rent that has to be paid by the buyer bears the possibility of making him 
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decide against switching even though the price charged by the new supplier is below 
the incumbent’s price less switching costs. 
When competition and effects of economies of scale are taken into account, partial 
switching and thus multiple sourcing is to be preferred when the entrant is an 
intermediate-cost supplier. Competition can be instilled or cost-reducing efforts be 
triggered by pursuing a dual sourcing strategy. 
To summarise, in reality (where asymmetric information is the standard) the optimal 
decision can be achieved by offering a menu of contracts. It determines both the 
quantity to be delivered and the transfer payments according to the potential cost 
structures of the new supplier. This represents the best solution possible despite the 
fact that some switching possibilities having been identified as beneficial ex-post were 
not taken by the buyer. (Cf. id., p.711) 
 
The most evident differences of the two models examined are that 
1. Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) consider auditing, in addition to entry, as 
a possible instrument for cost verification and that 
2. Wagner and Friedl (2007) take competitive reactions and partial switching into 
account. 
Despite these differences, the results of both models, in their own ways, go along the 
same lines. Both come to the conclusion that switching to another supplier, depending 
on the conditions, can be an advantageous option. Nonetheless, the findings acquired 
have to be examined critically since they heavily rely on the assumptions made. 
Basically, with regard to supplier switching a general directive cannot be predefined. 
Instead, considerations on an individual basis have to be carried out to find the best 
possible decision. Above all, the basic principle will always have to be that an 
established supplier-buyer relationship should be terminated after careful consideration 
only. 
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5 Factors retarding or inhibiting supplier 
switching 
 
Factors of a variety of kind can have considerable influence on the decision to switch 
the supplier. The following chapters try to give an insight into this subject matter. 
 
5.1 Barriers to supplier switching 
 
“Switching barriers [...] refer to the difficulty of switching to another provider that is 
encountered by a [...] [buyer] who is dissatisfied with the […] [actual performance] or to 
the financial, social and psychological burden felt by a […] [buyer] when switching to a 
new […] provider. In brief, switching barriers represent any factor that makes it more 
difficult or costly […] to change providers.” (Mei-Fang et al., 2006, p.546) Such barriers 
protect incumbent suppliers from potential rivals and create a competitive advantage 
on their part. Thus, overcoming a barrier will be made difficult for an alternative 
provider. (Cf. Li et al., 2006, p.548) In the following, different kinds of barriers will be 
examined. 
The first barrier refers to those people of the buying company who are authorised to 
make decisions in this regard. Since wrong decisions may have serious negative 
influences on further career steps, deciders usually prefer to continue and improve 
actual supplier-buyer relationships (voice strategy) instead of opting for unknown 
sources which may perform just as good as or even worse than the former one. This 
may result in a long-run phase of weak performance on the part of the vendor and, at 
the same time, a reduced performance of the buying company. An even bigger 
performance gap may arise in the course of the transition period of switching when the 
process itself does not run as smooth as planned. 
In fact, estimating the actual dimension of such a gap in advance is possible to a very 
limited extent only. The decision maker’s uncertainty gets even higher against this 
background. Consequently, the uncertainty regarding the performance of a new 
supplying source is one of the most significant barriers existing. (Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.63f.) 
In this regard, the hidden characteristics of a potential new supplier have to be 
examined more precisely. Since the buyer is not able to fully assess all information 
necessary concerning the supply object in question (like the true cost or quality), the 
purchasing company tends to refrain from changing the supplier. The potential vendor’s 
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cost structure being effective prior to the initiation of the supplier-buyer relationship can 
be seen as a hidden characteristic. Therefore, the buyer has to deal with the possible 
risk of selecting a new provider with properties which are undesired. Still, the supplying 
company can be induced to reveal these characteristics providing incentives on the 
part of the purchaser. (Cf. Wagner et al., 2007, p.701f.) 
A tendency to continue the relationship with an incumbent supplier is to be observed 
when members of the purchasing company can look back on beneficial experiences 
concerning (Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.64) “past businesses or social relationships” (Ibid.). 
Efficient routines arising out of long-term collaboration within a supplier-buyer 
relationship are of particular importance in this context. For example, knowing the 
contact person in the event of problems or sharing of knowledge fall in this category. 
(Cf. Li et al., 2006, p.554) 
Power structures within the buying organisation may constitute a barrier which is 
difficult to overcome in case diverging interests between departments are present. 
“Habit and an aversion to change can cause strong inertia, since employees are used 
to the way of doing business with the old supplier and do not want to modify their 
processes.” (Kirst, 2008, p.64) 
Social interests which are inconsistent with the buyer’s interests and which arise out of 
personal relations existing between members of the purchasing and the supplying 
company can hamper the replacement of an incumbent supplier. 
Limited information exchange and communication make it difficult to estimate the real 
performance of the potential new supplier or to examine the process of switching. This 
results in an extension of time having to be spent. 
Another factor which can give rise to further troubles and may lead to an increase of 
the performance gap is opportunistic behaviour on the part of the former vendor, 
starting as soon as the termination of the business relationship is announced. 
In the majority of cases, specific investments have to be made by the purchaser at the 
beginning of the supplier-buyer relationship to adjust to the supplied good. They 
represent further barriers of great importance in matters of switching as they turn into 
sunk costs in case of the termination of this relationship. Consequently, the following 
rule applies: In case of low asset specificity, switching tends to be easier than it would 
be the other way round. (Cf. ibid.) In addition to these investments, the arising 
switching costs constitute a significant exit barrier as well. The simultaneous 
appearance of both can make a replacement of the supplier even more unattractive or, 
at worst, impossible. (Cf. id., p.54) “Buyers frequently face switching costs, as a result 
of earlier commitments to particular product technologies or vendors”. (Heide et al., 
66 
1995, p.30) These can be seen as one-time costs arising when the buying company 
switches completely or partially. (Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.67) 
All of these barriers retard the decision process concerning exit or voice strategy. As 
long as no activities are undertaken, neither towards a performance improvement nor 
towards switching, the purchasing company will pursue the loyalty strategy. In 
consideration of uncertainty, switching costs and other barriers, the replacement of 
suppliers can be characterised as challenging, complex and costly. (Cf. id. p.65) 
Generally speaking, changing the vendor becomes the more difficult the higher the 
number of switching barriers within a supplier-buyer relationship is. (Cf. Mei-Fang et al., 
2006, p.547) “Consequently, systematic supplier switching activities that aim for a 
decline of uncertainty and additional costs as well as a reduction of the time needed for 
a supplier replacement can lower the barriers for supplier switching.” (Kirst, 2008, p.65) 
Thus, switching may become a viable option for a purchaser facing supplier 
weaknesses. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
As the incurred switching costs influence the supplier’s decision to switch in a 
significant way, this subject matter will be covered separately. 
 
5.1.1 Switching costs 
 
Switching costs arise when the purchaser makes a decision in favour of switching the 
supplier. These costs not only consist of directly effective monetary costs, such as 
those emerging from the search of alternative sources. They also include further 
potential costs like, for example, costs for quality assurance during the transitional 
phase or opportunity costs (e.g. loss of the former supplier’s know-how). Specific 
investments made in the course of the supplier’s vertical integration are of particular 
importance when determining switching costs. In case of a replacement of the supplier, 
a transfer of these usually irreversible specific investments to other providers will not be 
possible. This is known as so-called sunk costs. On the other hand, new supplier-buyer 
relationships have to be integrated in value-added processes as well, and 
consequently cause specific investments on their part. This particular mechanism 
constitutes a hurdle concerning the termination of a suboptimal supplier relation for the 
buying company frequently. Investment needs and potential costs of new sources are 
hard to assess. Thus, the risk of an overcompensation of the inherent potential savings 
of alternative relations arises. (Cf. Arnold, 2007, p.224) 
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5.1.1.1 Types of switching costs 
 
The classification of switching costs by Burnham et al. (2003) with regard to provider 
switching of final customers can, in adapted form, be used for the present subject 
matter. According to this, switching costs can be classified as procedural, financial or 
relational switching costs. (Cf. Burnham, 2003, p.112) 
The procedural switching costs mainly refer to investments in matters of time and 
effort. This includes the following costs: 
• The “economic risk costs are the costs of accepting uncertainty with the 
potential for a negative outcome when adopting a new provider about which the 
[…] [buyer] has insufficient information”. (Id., p.111) Three kinds of consumption 
risks are included here, performance, financial and convenience risk. 
• In order to make proper switching decisions, information about potential new 
suppliers has to be gathered to carry out an evaluation. The therewith related 
time and effort costs are called evaluation costs. 
• Learning costs may accrue in the course of the supplier replacement since the 
buyer may be required to acquire new skills and know-how in connection with 
the usage of the new good supplied. Mostly, learning investments are supplier-
specific which means that the adaptation to the selected vendor is accompanied 
by the need to make new investments. 
• Finally, setup costs arise which can be traced back to the process connected 
with the initiation of the new supplier-buyer relationship or to activities 
necessary for the initial use of a new product. (Cf. ibid.) 
The financial switching costs are related to “the loss of financially quantifiable 
resources” (Id., p.112). Benefit and monetary loss costs belong to this category. 
• The advantage of a persistent supplier-buyer relationship lies in the potential 
possibility of discounts and other economic benefits. When changing the 
supplier these advantages may get lost, creating the so-called benefit loss 
costs. 
• The monetary loss costs comprise the entire one-time costs not connected with 
the buying of the good itself (the costs arising due to the replacement of 
transaction-specific assets, for example). (Cf. id., p.111) 
The relational switching costs involve “psychological or emotional discomfort due to the 
loss of identity and the breaking of bonds” (Id., p.112) and include personal and brand 
relationship loss costs. The latter will not be addressed in greater detail at this point 
since it is related to final consumers basically. The former refers to the affective losses 
arising due to the dissolution of the bonds of identification which have been established 
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between members of the buying and supplying company. The familiarity with 
responsible contact persons in the supplying organisation creates a certain comfort 
level which cannot be existent at the very beginning of a new supplier-buyer 
relationship. (Cf. id, p.111f.) 
 
5.2 Switching inertia 
 
Switching inertia can be defined as the buyer’s persistence within the present supplier-
buyer relationship. (Cf. Li et al., 2006, p.549) As long as the practices pursued in a 
company are efficient, inertia is not costly to a vast extent. But as soon as efficiency 
decreases, the related costs begin to increase. (Cf. id., p.554) 
The main sources of inertia and two phenomena connected with each other, status quo 
effect and decision avoidance, help to explain inertia with regard to supplier switching. 
(Cf. Wagner et al., 2007, p.701) For this reason, both will be examined more closely in 
the following subchapters. 
Consecutively, it will shortly be dealt with investments made to improve the incumbent 
supplier’s performance since this topic is related to switching inertia. Following this, a 
strategy recommended to a buyer in the presence of inertia will be highlighted. 
 
5.2.1 Main sources 
 
Referring to Rumelt (1995), distorted perception, dulled motivation, failed creative 
response, political deadlocks and action disconnects can be stated as sources of 
inertia; a closer look at these sources should contribute to a better understanding of 
switching inertia. (Cf. Rumelt, 1995, p.105f.) 
Perception serves as the starting point of change and, therefore, in case of perceptual 
distortion, it may happen that change is constrained. The sources of such distortion 
causing “organizational inertia are: myopia, hubris and denial, and grooved thinking” 
(Id., p.106). Myopia within an organisation addresses the problem that the decisions 
made and the activities taken are not directed to the future. Denial can be explained as 
“the rejection of information that is contrary to what is desired or what is believed to be 
true […] [and] may stem from hubris - overweening pride in past accomplishments - or 
it may derive from fear.” (Id., p.107) Grooved thinking describes the behaviour of 
rejecting information and ideas that are characterised by a strong deviation from 
orthodoxy. (Cf. id., pp.106-108) 
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A company’s need to change may be missing in spite of a precise perception. This can 
be traced back to insufficient motivation; here, the term ‘dulled motivation’ is used. The 
motivational dampers mainly include different types of cost which arise due to change. 
(Cf. id., p.108) 
Even if the difficulties with regard to perception and motivation are missing, change 
may not be induced in some cases. This is referred to as ‘failed creative response’ and 
may result from the fact that analysing the situation or generally making a choice is 
problematic for the organisation. Here, a blocking of change can occur if decisions 
have to be made within a very short time, a complex situation is on hand, decision 
makers opine that they have to deal with natural and unavoidable problems and if the 
direction chosen is inadequate. (Cf. id., pp.109-111) 
A further source of inertia is political deadlocks of which three different types can be 
distinguished. A very common type is the politics of self interest which implies that a 
decision maker refrains from making a decision which potentially harms him, even if it 
was the only proper way. Another reason for a deadlock can be traced back to 
divergent beliefs concerning the problem’s nature or solution on the part of 
organisational members involved in the decision-making process. Furthermore, great 
difficulties are associated with vested values which can be described as “strong 
emotional or value attachments to products, policies, or ways of doing things” (Id., 
p.112f.) inherent in individuals. (Cf. ibid.) 
Action disconnects, representing the last source to be examined, can be attributed to 
“leadership inaction, embedded routines, collective action problems, and capabilities 
gaps” (Id., p.113). In order not to impede change, a leader has to express the vision of 
change, give incentives, act and assign power. Here, a big problem is that leadership is 
attached to status quo due to various reasons like, for instance, uncertainty in relation 
to the unknown. The ways how things are done (in other words the processes) form 
business and the more complex a process is, the greater is inertia. Another blocking 
factor is represented by collective action problems such as the first mover problem. If 
the management demands change, subordinates may ask themselves if it is worth to 
be the first mover, resulting in no action taking place in many cases. A further problem 
in this context is related to the culture that prevails within an organisation. (Cf. id., 
pp.113-115) If it is characterised by its resistance to change or does not conform to the 
company’s objectives, it might constitute an insuperable source of inertness. As culture 
is contingent upon mutual expectations, a change cannot be induced easily. Being the 
last reason for action disconnects examined at this point, the so-called capability gap 
can be described as the difference between an organisation’s capabilities and the 
actions having to be taken in the course of running an organisation. (Cf. id., p.117) 
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5.2.2 Status quo effect and decision avoidance 
 
Different fields of research have identified that buying companies act sluggish with 
regard to making decisions in favour of replacing the incumbent supplier. In this 
context, the term status quo effect will be used, representing the tendency to adhere to 
present or preceding decisions. With reference to supplier switching, this means that 
the buyer orders the entire amount needed from the incumbent supplier. Thus, the 
situation remains unchanged. In contrast, a deviation from the status quo is on hand 
when the purchaser decides to switch to a new provider fully or partially. The norm 
theory used in psychology indicates that in case of changing the status quo or 
performing actions diverging from the norm, individuals tend to feel a higher degree of 
regret. Switching inertia on the part of the buying company can be observed if it is the 
norm to retain the status quo. (Cf. Wagner et al., 2007, p.701) 
 
The second phenomenon to be discussed at this point is decision avoidance which 
“manifests itself as a tendency to avoid making a choice by postponing it or by seeking 
an easy way out that involves no action or no change” (Anderson, 2003, p.139). 
Different forms of decision avoidance can be distinguished: status quo and omission 
bias, choice deferral and, finally, inaction inertia which overlaps with the 
aforementioned. 
As noted before, the former can be defined as the dominant preference to leave the 
situation unchanged, i.e. to maintain the status quo, even if the responsible person is 
advised to make a decision. (Cf. id., p.142f.) The status quo bias’s degree depends on 
the strength of the buyer’s preference and the number of potential suppliers. In this 
context, the following rules apply: 
1. the stronger the preference for a new provider, the weaker the bias, and 
2. the more alternative suppliers available, the stronger the relative bias. (Cf. 
Samuelson et al., 1988, p.8) 
Strongly linked to the status quo bias, omission bias can be described as the dominant 
preference to select options which do not demand action. 
Choice deferral - as the third form - is on hand when a decision is postponed 
temporarily. This comprises to take the time necessary in order to look for more 
advantageous possibilities, to decide not to choose one of a number of options or to try 
not to be responsible for the decision in question. (Cf. Anderson, 2003, p.143-144) 
Being the last form examined in this context, inaction inertia “refers specifically to the 
tendency of a person to omit action when he or she already has passed up a similar, 
more attractive opportunity to act […]. This occurs especially when the subsequent 
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opportunity is somehow less attractive, even if it still represents a gain from one 
reference point.” (Id., p.146) 
On the basis of consumer research studies, it has been detected that the probability for 
consumers to choose the default option is higher when they “are asked to anticipate 
the regret and responsibility for making the wrong purchase decision” (Wagner et al., 
2007, p.701). Here, switching inertia can be observed if a decision against the 
replacement of the incumbent supplier is seen as the default option. This statement 
can, for instance, be deemed appropriate if the knowledge a purchaser has of the 
established supplier’s performance exceeds the knowledge he has of a potential one’s 
performance. (Cf. ibid.) 
 
5.2.3 Investments to improve the incumbent supplier’s 
performance 
 
Another frequently observed behaviour associated with switching inertia is that buying 
companies spend large amounts of resources and time to improve the incumbent 
supplier’s performance despite having identified its weakness beforehand. This 
tendency may be decreased at the outset by practicing the activities described 
subsequently. 
In case of a decision in favour of a supplier-development initiative, the buyer has to 
spend his resources and time without knowing whether his effort is crowned with 
success. Therefore, using certain instruments to analyse the adequacy of such 
initiatives is recommendable. A quantified assessment to examine whether the 
opportunity given to the established supplier to improve his performance is 
advantageous facilitates the decision in favour of voice or exit strategy and helps to 
overcome the tendency of sticking to the established supplier. Besides, the buyer is 
advised to specify the investments needed before deciding on pursuing the voice 
strategy. This should be done in order to prevent continuing sluggish behaviour if the 
situation remains unchanged and to limit the resources and the time spent. 
Right at the appearance of a supplier weakness, the buyer should take the 
replacement of the incumbent into consideration. Initiating the activities associated with 
the switching option at an early stage results in a substantial saving of time. Contrary, 
by deferring this possibility and deciding to pursue the voice strategy, the buyer could 
get caught in a vicious circle. As time and resources would be invested in the actual 
supplier-buyer relationship, the bias towards the incumbent would increase whereas 
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the will to change the provider would decrease. In the end, the pursuit of the exit 
strategy would be hampered again. 
Continuous monitoring of the supply market keeps the buying company informed 
regarding potential suppliers available. This becomes evident in case of an absolute 
weakness on the part of the actual supplier since the time needed to find a new 
provider can be reduced substantially. Additionally, detailed knowledge of the market 
makes it more likely to identify a relative weakness which harms the purchaser’s 
competitiveness. 
As already mentioned, the disengager’s sluggish behaviour with regard to switching 
decisions can be traced back to the uncertainty related to the actual performance level 
of the potential exchange partner. Auditing and assessment methods, like test runs in 
the run-up to contracting, should lead to a reduction of these uncertainties and provide 
better insights into the alternative partner’s real performance. (Cf. Kirst, 2008, p.202f.) 
 
5.2.4 Strategic orientation 
 
Before concluding the present chapter, some thoughts on a potential entrant supplier’s 
strategic orientation have to be made. Following Li, Madhok, Plaschka and Verma 
(2006), it would be best for a potential entrant supplier to pursue strategic positioning 
instead of operational effectiveness. (Cf. Li et al., 2006, p.568) Whereas the latter 
“means performing similar activities better than rivals […] [the former embraces] 
performing different activities from rivals or performing similar activities in different 
ways”. (Id., p.554) 
By following the operational effectiveness strategy, a potential supplier offers a similar 
value configuration compared to his rival. Since the established provider occupies his 
position by performing particular activities, it is likely that offering an improved 
performance will not be enough for the challenging supplier when switching inertia is 
existent. Additionally, it is greatly disadvantageous in such cases that competition takes 
place under the incumbent’s terms. This might deviate from the competencies of the 
potential entrant. 
If, in contrast, a potential supplier follows strategic positioning, he offers a divergent 
activity configuration in order to provide a differing value mix. This complies with the 
competencies of the entrant to a higher degree. Therefore, the incumbent’s response 
becomes more challenging. 
To summarise, as supplying companies try to gain competitive advantage, greater 
value has to be offered to customers. In the presence of switching inertia this is, 
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however, hard to achieve when following the operational effectiveness strategy. (Cf. id., 
p.554f.) 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The work at hand dealt with the subject matter of supplier switching and, in particular, 
with buying companies’ decision whether a supplier switch should be carried out or not. 
Since the process of switching is affected by various factors, their examination and 
analysis is of great importance to establish clarity within this topic. 
 
First of all, a consideration of factors triggering the replacement of an incumbent 
supplier and thus the need for switching and factors influencing the switching 
procedure’s level of difficulty and thus the easiness of switching has been carried out to 
help create a fundamental understanding for the subject matter. The former is reflected 
in motives causing switching, such as lower prices, poor quality and performance, new 
technologies, the bankruptcy of a supplying company and the discovery of a better 
source, and contingencies or characteristics of products, processes or industries 
creating the need. The influencing factors of the latter are related to different sourcing 
strategies (e.g. single vs. multiple and individual vs. cooperative sourcing), conditions 
of the switching environment (relationship-specific investments, high dependency on 
the actual supplier, the number of potential suppliers and switching costs) and design 
decisions of a supply chain (governance, choice of actors, coordination and 
processes). In conclusion, the balancing of the need for and the easiness of switching 
shapes an organisation’s switching behaviour. The need as well as the easiness may 
be high or low, entailing different situations and reactions on the part of the company 
concerned. 
 
The consideration of the different phases which have to be run through in the course of 
a supplier switch, the activities to be performed in this regard and their constituents’ 
interrelation allows gaining a comprehensive picture of a supplier switch. The first 
phase, the supplier-switching decision phase, comprises the identification of a supplier 
weakness through evaluating the satisfaction with the current supplier-buyer 
relationship, the decision either to pursue loyalty, voice or exit strategy and, in case of 
deciding in favour of the latter, the final decision to switch. Representing the major 
tasks of the second phase, denominated as supplier-switching execution phase, the 
planning, steering and monitoring of the supplier switch should help to guarantee a 
smooth switching process. Finally, the supplier-switch success evaluation phase 
comprises the evaluation whether a performed switch has been successful or not. For 
this purpose, three different success dimensions (economic, technological and 
switching-related success) were measured to obtain more differentiated evaluation 
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results. Put together, these dimensions constitute the overall switching success which 
indicates the degree of satisfaction of the buying company following an executed 
switch. The disengager can look back at a successful switch when his supply situation 
has improved and therewith his competitive position. 
 
Two models designed to support companies in their decision-making process 
preceding a potential supplier switch were introduced to provide clarity regarding this 
topic. Accordingly, both come to the conclusion that switching, depending on the 
conditions, can be an advantageous option.  
Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) focus on the comparison of entry and auditing 
as instruments to verify the reported costs of the incumbent supplier. Their model 
shows that entry is not only able to imitate an audit but, in addition, provides the 
advantage of being both information provider and potential source. Depending on the 
conditions, the invitation probability of entry will be higher when the entrant’s cost 
disadvantage is small and when the incumbent can expect high rents emerging from 
his information advantage in case of non-use of a cost-verifying instrument. It shows 
that production by the entrant is optimal even in case of high costs on his part as the 
supplemental production costs are easily compensated by the gains resulting from 
having influence on cost exaggeration. 
Wagner and Friedl (2007) examine whether a company decides in favour of entire or 
partial switching in case of symmetric and asymmetric cost information on the part of 
the purchaser. By incorporating the factors competition and economies of scale, their 
impact on the established supplier and the switching decision is highlighted. It shows 
that an information premium has to be paid by the buyer in order to get a true cost 
report. Furthermore, it was found that the optimal decision in case of asymmetric 
information can be achieved by offering a menu of contracts that determines both the 
quantity to be delivered and the transfer payments according to the new supplier’s 
potential cost structures. This applies despite the fact that some switching possibilities 
having been identified as beneficial ex-post were not taken. When costs are 
unobservable, the buyer decides in favour of a complete switch if the reported costs 
are lower than a threshold determined and against it if costs exceed this threshold. By 
way of comparison, if competition and effects of economies of scale are taken into 
account, partial switching and thus dual sourcing is to be preferred when the entrant is 
an intermediate-cost supplier. In contrast, the buyer decides in favour of a full switch if 
the new supplier has low costs and in favour of no switching if his costs are high. 
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In general, the findings acquired heavily rely on the assumptions made and, therefore, 
a general directive cannot be predefined. Thus, finding the best possible decision 
demands considerations on an individual basis. 
 
At last, factors having a hindering impact on the decision to replace the established 
supplier were considered. Being aware of these factors from the outset may facilitate 
the decision-making process. 
On the one hand, the act of switching is made more difficult or costly by certain 
barriers. These barriers include, amongst others, the behaviour of decision makers and 
other persons of the buying company involved, uncertainty, specific investments and 
switching costs. The latter is, without doubt, one of the most important aspects that has 
to be taken into account when considering the replacement of an established supplier. 
Directly effective monetary costs, such as costs for the search of alternative sources as 
well as further potential costs like opportunity costs (e.g. loss of the former supplier’s 
know-how), can be seen as switching costs. Furthermore, specific investments related 
to the integration of suppliers are of particular importance when determining switching 
costs as these investments become sunk costs. 
On the other hand, the tendency of buying companies towards inertial behaviour 
concerning supplier switching can be observed. The main sources of inertia are 
distorted perception, dulled motivation, failed creative response, political deadlocks and 
action disconnects. Status quo effect and decision avoidance are explicatory 
psychological phenomena in this context. Whereas the former means to adhere to 
present or preceding decisions, the latter represents the tendency to avoid a decision 
by suspension or by looking for alternatives not presuming action or change. 
 
Finally, having examined the subject matter of supplier switching closely, it becomes 
apparent that this topic is underrepresented in scientific literature despite its particular 
significance. Thus, additional research is required to clarify issues still in question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, Christopher J.: The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision 
Avoidance Result from Reason and Emotion. In: Psychological Bulletin, 2003, Vol.129, 
No.1, pp.139-167 
 
Arnold, Ulli: Beendigung von Lieferantenbeziehungen in Unternehmensnetzwerken. In: 
Garcia Sanz, Francisco J.; Semmler, Klaus; Walther, Johannes [Ed.]: Die 
Automobilindustrie auf dem Weg zur globalen Netzwerkkompetenz: Effiziente und 
flexible Supply Chains erfolgreich gestalten. Berlin [et al.]: Springer-Verlag 2007, 
pp.215-229 
 
Burnham, Thomas A.; Frels, Judy K.; Mahajan, Vijay: Consumer Switching Costs: A 
Typology, Antecedents, and Consequences. In: Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 2003, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp.109-126 
 
Demski, Joel S.; Sappington, David E.M.; Spiller, Pablo T.: Managing supplier 
switching. In: The Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1987, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.77-97 
 
Heide, Jan B.; Weiss, Allen M.: Vendor Consideration and Switching Behavior for 
Buyers in High-Technology Markets. In: The Journal of Marketing, July 1995, Vol. 59, 
No. 3, pp.30-43 
 
Heijboer, Godefriedus J.: Quantitative analysis of strategic and tactical purchasing 
decisions. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Twente, Enschede: Twente University 
Press, 2003 
 
Kirst, Phillip: Switching Integrated Suppliers - A multiple case analysis of supplier 
switches in an industrial context. Doctoral Dissertation, University of St. Gallen, 
Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2008 
 
Kirst, Phillip; Hofmann, Erik: Supplier integration and the challenge of relationship-exit 
strategies. In: Otto, Andreas; Obermaier, Robert [Ed.]: Logistikmanagement - Analyse, 
Bewertung und Gestaltung logistischer Systeme. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-
Verlag, 2007, pp.397-425 
 
 
78 
Li, Sali; Madhok, Anoop; Plaschka, Gerhard; Verma, Rohit: Supplier-Switching Inertia 
and Competitve Asymmetry: A Demand-Side Perspective. In: Decision Sciences, 
November 2006, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.547-576 
 
Mayer, Barbara; Pfeiffer, Thomas; Schneider, Georg: Warum die Kapitalwertmethode 
versagt! Zur Kapitalbudgetierung bei Agency-Konflikten. In: Wirtschaftswissenschaft-
liches Studium, September 2005, Vol. 34, Iss. 9, pp.500-505 
 
Mei-Fang, Chen; Ling-Huei, Wang: The Impact of Switching Barriers on Customer 
Loyalty in Professional Service Contexts. 2006 IEEE International Conference on 
Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, Shanghai P.R. China, pp. 545-550, 
available online: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4125639, 
as of April 12, 2010 
 
Rumelt, Richard P.: Inertia and Transformation. In: Montgomery, Cynthia A. [Ed.]: 
Resource-Based and Evolutionary Theories of the Firm: Towards a Synthesis, Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp.101-132 
 
Samuelson, William; Zeckhauser, Richard: Status Quo Bias in Decision Making. In: 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, March 1988, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, pp.7-59 
 
Verdujin, Thierry Martijn: Dynamism in supply networks: Actor switching in a turbulent 
business environment. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Rotterdam: 2004 
 
Wagner, Stephan M.; Friedl, Gunther: Supplier switching decisions. In: European 
Journal of Operational Research, 2007, Vol. 183, Iss. 2, pp.700-717 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
Appendix 
 
Referring to Chapter 4, the calculations corresponding to Figure 5 can be found in the 
following. 
 
In case of asymmetric information, a complete switch takes place when *cc ≤ . The 
reported costs of the entrant do not exceed the threshold *c  with probability 
)()( ** cFccP =≤ . In this case, a constant transfer payment ( ** )( cct = ) will be 
offered by the buyer independently of the entrant’s costs. The reduction of the buyer’s 
costs amounts to )(* ctp −  and thus to *cp − . Hence, the subsequent optimisation 
problem has to be solved: 
 
{ })()(max ** cFcp − . 
 
To differentiate with respect to *c  results due to 1)( * =cf  and ** )( ccF =  in the first 
order condition: 
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Information premium, switching intertia and costs of the buyer are split up as follows: 
 
Costs of the buyer: 
[ ] 2****** )()()( cpcccpcFcpE −=⋅−=⋅−
 
 
Information premium ( ],0[ *~ cUc ): 
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Switching inertia: 
First-best ( ],0[~ pUc ): [ ] 2)2()(
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To demonstrate the split-up conclusively, p and therewith 0c  are normalised to 1. 
Consequently 
2
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Switching inertia: 
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Abstract 
 
The work at hand deals with the subject matter of supplier switching. At first, the need 
for and the easiness of switching are examined. The need for switching is reflected in 
motives causing switching, such as lower prices and poor quality, and contingencies or 
characteristics of industries, processes or products creating the need. The easiness of 
switching is influenced by a great number of factors related to different sourcing 
strategies, conditions of the switching environment and design decisions of a supply 
chain. In conclusion, the balancing of the need for and the easiness of switching 
delivers insights into the switching behaviour of buying companies. 
In order to structure the whole switching process, the different phases which have to be 
run through in the course of a supplier switch are dealt with thereafter. Supplier-
switching decision, execution and success evaluation phase comprise activities ranging 
from actions taken prior to the switching decision as, for example, the identification of a 
supplier weakness, to the final success evaluation succeeding the performed switch. 
The work’s main part examines two models which deal with the option of replacing the 
incumbent supplier using different approaches in order to find out when and how it is 
optimal to switch. Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) focus on the comparison of 
entry and auditing as instruments to verify the reported costs of the established 
supplier against the background of changing the supplier or remaining with the present 
one. Their model shows that, depending on the conditions, a decision in favour of entry 
is more probable than in favour of auditing and that production by the entrant is optimal 
even in case of high costs on his part. Wagner and Friedl (2007) examine whether a 
company decides in favour of entire or partial switching in case of symmetric and 
asymmetric cost information on the part of the purchaser. It shows that full or no 
switching takes place and that inertia appears on the part of rational purchasers in 
course of a switching decision when the suppliers’ costs are unobservable. Then, the 
factors competition and economies of scale are introduced to highlight their impact on 
the established supplier and the switching decision. Here, it becomes obvious that, 
depending on the conditions, a decision in favour of no, partial or complete switching 
will be made. 
Finally, factors having a hindering impact on the decision in favour of supplier switching 
are examined. They include barriers attributable to the behaviour of decision makers 
and other persons of the buying company involved, uncertainty, specific investments 
and switching costs. Strongly related to those psychological phenomena denominated 
as status quo effect and decision avoidance, switching inertia is highlighted as being 
another greatly important factor in this regard. The chapter is completed by a short 
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description of activities which should help to avoid spending too large amounts of 
resources and time to improve the incumbent supplier’s performance and, lastly, by the 
recommendation of pursuing strategic positioning.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist der Thematik des Lieferantenwechsels gewidmet. Im 
Vordergrund stehen dabei zunächst Fragestellungen zur Notwendigkeit und 
Durchführbarkeit solcher Wechsel („need for and easiness of switching“). Während 
erstere sich in spezifischen Motiven wie Preisvorteilen und Qualitätssteigerungen, die 
einen Lieferantenwechsel auslösen, widerspiegeln und auf Charakteristika von 
Produkten, Arbeitsabläufen und Branchen zurückzuführen sind, wird letztere 
maßgeblich von Faktoren wie der gewählten Beschaffungsstrategie bzw. der 
Beschaffenheit des Umfelds und der Ausgestaltung der Lieferantenkette beeinflusst. 
Allgemein lässt sich festhalten, dass die Wechselbeziehung beider Einflussfaktoren 
zueinander das Verhalten eines zukaufenden Unternehmens in maßgeblicher Weise 
bestimmt. 
Im nächsten Schritt werden die Abläufe eines Lieferantenwechsels näher beleuchtet 
und anhand einer Erörterung der dabei zu durchlaufenden Phasen der 
Entscheidungsfindung, der Ausführung im engeren Sinn und der Erfolgsevaluierung 
strukturiert. Diese umfassen vor der eigentlichen Entscheidung zugunsten oder gegen 
einen Lieferantenwechsel liegende Vorgänge und Maßnahmen, etwa das Feststellen 
von Defiziten auf Seiten des Lieferanten, als auch solche, die dem Wechsel im 
engeren Sinn zeitlich nachfolgen (Evaluierung ex-post). 
Das umfangreichste Kapitel ist der Betrachtung zweier Modelle gewidmet, die sich bei 
der Beantwortung der Frage nach dem optimalen Zeitpunkt bzw. der bestmöglichen 
Umsetzung eines Lieferantenwechsels unterschiedlicher Herangehensweisen 
bedienen. Im Zentrum des von Demski, Sappington und Spiller (1987) entwickelten 
Modells steht der Vergleich zweier Instrumente zur Prüfung der vom bestehenden 
Lieferanten berichteten Kosten (Eintreten eines alternativen Lieferanten und 
Verwendung eines Kontrollinstruments). Ihr Ziel ist es, der Entscheidung für oder 
gegen eine weitere Zusammenarbeit eine fundierte Grundlage zu geben. Zu den dabei 
gewonnenen Erkenntnissen zählt, dass eine Entscheidung zugunsten eines Eintritts, 
abhängig von den jeweiligen Gegebenheiten, wahrscheinlicher ist als eine solche 
zugunsten der Verwendung des Kontrollinstruments. Es erweist sich darüber hinaus, 
dass die Produktion eines neu eintretenden Lieferanten auch dann optimal ist, wenn 
dieser höhere Kosten hat. Wagner und Friedl (2007) untersuchen, ob sich ein 
Unternehmen im Falle asymmetrischer bzw. symmetrischer Kosteninformation für 
einen partiellen oder kompletten Lieferantenwechsel entschließt. Dabei zeigt sich, dass 
eine Entscheidung zugunsten eines kompletten Wechsels oder zugunsten des 
bestehenden Lieferanten gefällt wird. Andererseits wird evident, dass im Falle von nicht 
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zu beobachtenden Kosten Trägheit („inertia“) seitens des zukaufenden Unternehmens 
auftritt. Eine Erweiterung des Modells um die Faktoren Wettbewerb und Skaleneffekte 
berücksichtigt deren Einfluss auf das Verhalten des bestehenden Lieferanten und die 
Entscheidung des Käufers. Hier zeigt sich, dass, abhängig von den jeweiligen 
Gegebenheiten, eine Entscheidung zugunsten einer Fortsetzung oder einer 
Beendigung der Zusammenarbeit bzw. der Inanspruchnahme beider Lieferanten 
getroffen wird. 
Schließlich werden jene Faktoren beschrieben, die den Entschluss zugunsten eines 
Lieferantenwechsels erschweren. Hierzu zählen den Entscheidungsträgern bzw. 
anderen involvierten Personen zuschreibbare Hemmnisse, Unsicherheiten, notwendige 
Investitionen und durch den Wechsel entstehende Kosten. Als wesentlicher Faktor zu 
berücksichtigen ist darüber hinaus die Trägheit, einen Wechsel zu vollziehen, die 
ihrerseits wesentlich von psychologischen Phänomenen, insbesondere dem Status-
Quo-Effekt und der Tendenz, Entscheidungen nach Möglichkeit auszuweichen 
(„decision avoidance“), geprägt ist. Die Arbeit schließt mit einer kurzen Darstellung von 
Aktivitäten, die dazu beitragen sollen, unnötig hohe Aufwendungen, sowohl in Bezug 
auf die eingesetzten finanziellen Mittel als auch die in Anspruch genommene 
Arbeitszeit, zu vermeiden und gibt abschließend die Empfehlung zur strategischen 
Positionierung des zuliefernden Unternehmens. 
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